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Article 2

LEGISLATIVE DESIGN AND THE CONTROLLABLE
COSTS OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION
EVAN C. ZOLDAN ∗
ABSTRACT
Legislation that singles out an identifiable individual for benefits or harms that do not apply to the rest of the population is
called “special legislation.” In previous work, I have argued
that special legislation is constitutionally suspect. In this Article,
I explore the normative consequences of special legislation, assessing both the costs it imposes and the benefits that it can provide. Drawing on constitutional theory, public choice theory, and
the history of special legislation, I argue that the enactment of
special legislation is costly when it reflects the corruption of the
legislative process and leads to low-quality legislation, unjustifiably unequal treatment, and legislative encroachment on the judicial and executive functions. By contrast, special legislation is
normatively attractive when it addresses a problem unique to a
particular location, when it addresses a matter of public concern,
when it reduces rather than exacerbates disuniformity in the law,
and when it provides relief for underrepresented political minorities. After considering these costs and benefits, I suggest modifications to the legislative process to diminish the costs associated
with special legislation while still preserving its benefits.
INTRODUCTION
The Maryland statute creating a special exemption for Tesla did not
single out the company by name, of course. But, lawmakers and media observers had no doubt that the statute’s purpose was to allow Tesla, and no
other carmaker, to circumvent the traditional manufacturer-dealer relation© 2019 Evan C. Zoldan.
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ship and sell cars directly to consumers. 1 The statute itself makes clear that
it is limited to Tesla alone; it applies only to manufacturers that have no
dealers in the state and that deal exclusively “in electric or nonfossil-fuel
burning vehicles.” 2 As Maryland’s lawmakers knew, that description applied only to Tesla. 3 And to make sure that no upstart firm might later take
advantage of the exemption, the legislature limited the number of licenses
available under the new exception to four. 4 Observers noted at the time that
the law was “specifically crafted for Tesla,” 5 and traditional automakers
agreed to this exception only on the understanding that it “would apply to
Tesla alone.” 6 Maryland’s “Tesla Law” is not unique. New Jersey and
Washington, among other states, have passed their own Tesla Laws, ensuring that Tesla, and Tesla alone, can offer electric cars directly to consumers. 7
Tesla Laws can be viewed, if taken in isolation, as the result of one
company’s shrewd lobbying and public relations campaign to obtain a market advantage. But, there is a richer story to be told—a story about the
power of legislatures to single out named individuals for special treatment
not accorded to anyone else. Statutes that grant special treatment to particular individuals—often called “special legislation”—are routinely, and often
quietly, enacted by state legislatures and Congress every year.
The Anglo-American legal tradition reflects a suspicion of statutes,
like Tesla Laws, that single out individuals for special treatment. Legal
philosophers have long argued that special legislation tests the limits of
what may be considered “law.” John Locke wrote that the legislature may
not “rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees.” 8 Instead, it is confined to en-

1. Matthew Debord, Maryland Carved out an Innovative Special Exception for Tesla to Sell
INSIDER
(Apr.
15,
2015),
Cars
Directly
to
Consumers,
BUS.
https://www.businessinsider.com/maryland-carved-out-a-special-exception-for-tesla-to-sell-carsdirectly-to-customers-2015-4; Angelo Young, Tesla Motors Inc. (TSLA) Wins Approval for Direct
Car Sales in Maryland, Starting October 1, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 12, 2015),
https://www.ibtimes.com/tesla-motors-inc-tsla-wins-approval-direct-car-sales-maryland-startingoctober-1-1918655.
2. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 15-305(e)(2)(i) (2018).
3. Debord, supra note 1.
4. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 15-305(e)(2)(ii).
5. Young, supra note 1.
6. Debord, supra note 1.
7. Daniel Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of Crony Capitalism, 101
IOWA L. REV. 573, 584–85 (2016); Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 439–40 (2017); Andrew Thurlow, Washington Governor Signs
NEWS
(Apr.
8,
2014),
Tesla
Compromise
Bill,
AUTOMOTIVE
https://www.autonews.com/article/20140408/RETAIL07/140409837/washington-governor-signstesla-compromise-bill.
8. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 136 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690).
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acting laws that are “common to every one of that society” 9 and that may
not be varied “in particular cases.” 10 Similarly, William Blackstone distinguished the concept of a civil law, which is “permanent, uniform, and universal,” from a statutory order to a single individual, which he called “a
sentence” rather than a law. 11 The United States Supreme Court invoked
this long tradition when it noted that “not every act, legislative in form” can
be considered “law.” 12 Rather, “a special rule for a particular person or a
particular case,” including “acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments,
and acts directly transferring one man’s estate to another,” are simply excluded from its definition. 13
Modern philosophers of law, too, have struggled to explain whether a
statute directed to a particular person can be considered law. In his seminal
work, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart wrestles to define law in a way that
excludes the “gunman case”—that is, Hart seeks a definition of “law” that
excludes the demand of an armed gunman to a bank clerk to hand over the
money in his care. 14 One way that Hart distinguishes the demand of an
armed gunman from the threat of punishment for violating a properly
promulgated criminal law is the fact that the latter case, but not the former,
requires the application of a generally applicable rule of conduct to a particular situation. Although a law sometimes can be directed at an individual,
Hart argues, the “standard form” of a law “applies to a general class of persons who are expected to see that it applies to them and to comply with
it.” 15 In light of this distinction, the individualized order of a policeman,
while resembling superficially the gunman’s demand to the bank clerk, is
quite different. The policeman enforces rules (for example, stop at stop
signs) against particular individuals; but, the rules themselves are generally
applicable—that is, everyone is bound to obey them. By contrast, the gunman’s demand applies to the clerk alone. 16 Relying on this distinction between generally applicable rules and individualized commands, Hart concludes that “it is normally understood that . . . [a modern state’s] general
laws extend to all persons within its territorial boundaries.” 17 Similarly,
although stopping short of suggesting that every particularized statute falls
9. Id. at § 22.
10. Id. § 142.
11. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *44. By contrast, acts of Parliament that “only operate upon particular persons, and private concerns,” called
“[s]pecial or private acts,” were required to be formally pleaded before judges would take notice
of them. Id. at *86.
12. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
13. Id. at 535–36.
14. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 20–22 (2012).
15. Id. at 21.
16. Id. at 21–22.
17. Id. at 21.
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outside the definition of “law,” Lon Fuller argues that the generality of law
is the “first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules.” 18 As a result, a system that fails to promulgate generally applicable rules has failed to make law. 19
Whether special legislation is “law” is an issue separate from whether
it is a normatively attractive way of setting legal rights and obligations.
Philosophical arguments aside, therefore, we can ask whether a legislature
should target an individual for special treatment not applicable to the population at large. This is not (merely) an academic question. Both state legislatures and Congress routinely enact statutes, like the Tesla Laws described
above, that target a particular individual. Through special laws, Congress
and state legislatures grant public funds to named individuals, 20 exempt particular people from generally applicable laws,21 and even intervene in pending court cases to favor one litigant over another. 22 Identifying the normatively attractive and unattractive features of special legislation, and
proposing ways that legislatures can minimize its unattractive features, are
the subjects of this Article.
This Article is part of a long-term project that describes and defines
the parameters of a constitutional principle that favors generality in legislation and disfavors special legislation. This principle, which I introduced in
prior work, 23 may be called a value of legislative generality. A value of
legislative generality finds support in the Constitution’s history, text, and
jurisprudential underpinnings. First, in the decade after independence, newly independent state legislatures enacted all types of particularized statutes.
These statutes transferred title to land, 24 granted exemptions from the stand-

18. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46 (1969).
19. Id. at 46–49.
20. Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565
(2013) (transferring $174,000 to named individual).
21. Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. 115-2, § 1, 131 Stat. 6, 6; Priv. L. No. 111-1, § 1, 124 Stat.
4523, 4523–24 (2010).
22. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (upholding a statute intervening in a particular, pending lawsuit); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (upholding a
statute picking the winner in one particular, pending case); see Evan C. Zoldan, Is the Federal
Judiciary Independent of Congress, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 135 (2018).
23. Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625 (2014) [hereinafter Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality]; Evan C. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component
of Legislative Generality, 51 RICH. L. REV. 489 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The Equal Protection
Component]; Evan C. Zoldan, The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing Solution,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The Klein Rule].
24. COUNCIL OF CENSORS, A Report, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, AS ESTABLISHED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION 35, 40 (Philadelphia, Francis
Bailey 1784) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA REPORT].
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ing laws, 25 confiscated property from named individuals, 26 and punished
political undesirables. 27 After a decade of suffering from social and economic dislocations caused by special legislation, the revolutionary generation wholeheartedly repudiated their legislatures’ power to enact it. By the
mid-1780s, in their writings, speeches, and debates, the revolutionary generation denounced their legislatures in no uncertain terms for “extending
their deliberations to the cases of individuals.” 28 On the eve of the drafting
of the Constitution, ordinary and prominent members of the revolutionary
generation alike made clear that American republicanism was inconsistent
with the legislative imposition of privileges or burdens on identifiable individuals. 29
Second, a value of legislative generality is supported by the clauses of
the Constitution, and other constitutional principles, that disfavor legislation
targeting identifiable individuals for particularized treatment. These clauses
and principles include the Bill of Attainder,30 Ex Post Facto, 31 Contract, 32
Equal Protection, 33 Due Process, 34 Takings, 35 and General Welfare 36 clauses, as well as the Klein rule of decision principle. 37 Although none of these
provisions or principles is exclusively about legislative generality, each
contributes to the value of legislative generality because each disfavors or

25. Address of the Council of Censors (Feb. 14, 1786), in RECORDS OF THE COUNCIL OF
CENSORS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 58, 60–70 (Paul S. Gillies & D. Gregory Sanford eds.,
1991) [hereinafter VERMONT REPORT].
26. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 302
(1967).
27. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 279
(1969).
28. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 24, at 38.
29. WOOD, supra note 27, at 401. For an extended historical argument about the revolutionary generation’s rejection of targeted legislation, see Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 23, at 669–79.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1; United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441–
42 (1965).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1; Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and
the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693 (1960).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
33. U.S. CONST. amend XIV; Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000).
34. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY
52–53 (2003).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court has recognized that “the sovereign may not take the
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is
paid just compensation.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Court has suggested that appropriations must be limited to expenditures designed “to provide for the general welfare.” Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 632, 640 (1937).
37. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144–47 (1871). The Klein rule of decision principle provides that Congress may not prescribe a rule of decision for the federal courts to
follow in a particular pending case. See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 23, at 2133.
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prohibits a certain type of particularized legislation. 38 For example, the
Equal Protection Clause is primarily concerned with government classifications of individuals into groups according to some identifiable characteristic. 39 However, the Court has also emphasized that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits legislative specification by limiting the government’s
power to single out an individual as a “class of one.” 40 Similarly, although
the Due Process Clause has been applied to a wide array of government actions, one of its oldest applications prohibits the legislature from “taking the
property of A and giving it to B.” 41 In this same way, each of the abovenoted clauses and principles reinforces legislative generality, either because
of the effect given to it by the Court, its place in the constitutional structure,
or the historical experiences that gave rise to its inclusion in the Constitution.
Third, jurists and philosophers of law have long argued either that targeted legislation is outside the legislative power altogether or that it is bad
law. As noted above, Locke suggested that a statute singling out an individual for special treatment simply is not within the legislative power.42
Moreover, commentators assessing the normative implications of special
legislation have concluded that it is “unjust,” 43 “unfair,” 44 and iniquitous. 45
This Article advances the broad project outlined above by assessing
the costs and benefits of special legislation and suggesting modifications to
the legislative process to reduce special legislation’s costs without eliminating its benefits.
Part I defines special legislation and provides examples that elucidate
its key features.
Part II describes the costs that special legislation imposes on society.
Although not every special law imposes these costs, special legislation usually reflects some combination of the following: corruption of the legislative process; low-quality legislation; unjustifiably unequal treatment; and
legislative encroachment on the judicial and executive functions.
Part III mounts a limited defense of special legislation. Special legislation persists despite the costs described above, in part, because special
38. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 23, at 653.
39. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008).
40. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
For an explanation of the “class of one” doctrine, see Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component,
supra note 23, at 525–31.
41. ORTH, supra note 34, at 52–53; see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
42. LOCKE, supra note 8, § 142.
43. Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Laws, in ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS
173 (James E. G. Zetzel ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
44. FULLER, supra note 18, at 47.
45. VERMONT REPORT, supra note 25, at 67–68.
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legislation can also benefit society. Specifically, special legislation can be a
useful way to address a problem unique to a particular location, serve a public purpose, cure disuniformities created by the generally applicable laws,
and provide relief for politically marginalized individuals.
Part IV suggests an approach to special legislation that is more nuanced than the one currently taken by the states and Congress. Many states
broadly prohibit special legislation despite the benefits that it can provide.
Federal law, by contrast, places almost no restrictions on special legislation
despite its costs. Identifying special legislation’s costs and benefits suggests, however, that neither of these approaches is optimal. Instead, both
Congress and state legislatures can reduce the costs of special legislation
without completely eliminating its benefits by modifying their rules of procedure. Specifically, legislatures should consider adopting one or more of
the following procedural rules: a rule requiring that special legislation may
be enacted only by a legislative supermajority; a rule requiring public notice
and providing an opportunity for public participation before special legislation is enacted; and a rule prohibiting special legislation unless it is accompanied by an official statement of the law’s purpose.
This Article offers a few contributions to the existing literature on special legislation. First, discussions of special legislation normally focus exclusively on special legislation enacted by state legislatures.46 This Article,
by contrast, draws on examples of both state and federal special legislation.
By recognizing that both Congress and state legislatures enact special legislation, this Article is able to draw on a more robust set of examples and, as
a result, is better able to evaluate special legislation’s costs and benefits.
Second, the costs of special legislation are often described as historically
contingent—that is, commentators have described the costs of special legis-

46. CHARLES CHAUNCEY BINNEY, RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6 (1894); WILLIAM BACKUS GUITTEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS UPON SPECIAL LEGISLATION CONCERNING MUNICIPALITIES 8 (1905); ROBERT
LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS: DEVELOPMENT, STATUS, AND TREND OF THE TREATMENT AND
EXERCISE OF LAWMAKING POWERS 532 (1935); Lyman Cloe & Sumner Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 KY. L.J. 351, 356 (1936); Dan Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional
Theory to the Interpretation of State Constitutions: The Ban on Special Laws in Maryland, 71 MD.
L. REV. 411, 441 (2012); Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and
Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 642 (1994); Thomas F. Green, A Malapropian Provision of State Constitutions, 24 WASH. U. L.Q. 359, 363 (1939); Frank E. Horack, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone Part I, 12 IND. L.J. 109, 115 (1936); Frank Horack & Matthew
Welsh, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone Part III, 12 IND. L.J. 183, 183 (1937); Robert
M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 277–78 (2004); Justin R. Long, State Constitutional
Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719, 723 (2012); Anthony Schutz, State Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as Structural Restraints, 40 J. LEGIS. 39, 43 (2014).
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lation in particular time periods, including the colonial period, 47 during the
confederation era 48 or the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.49
This Article analyzes special legislation from a theoretical rather than a historical perspective, revealing that the costs and benefits of special legislation are not historically contingent. Third, although the costs of special legislation have been described by commentators, with limited exception, the
benefits of special legislation have been overlooked. 50 This Article argues
that, normatively, special legislation should not be treated monolithically.
Rather, it can provide benefits as well as impose costs. Fourth, most recent
work on special legislation (including my own work) has focused on
whether special legislation is constitutional.51 This Article considers
whether, constitutional arguments aside, legislative rules can be designed to
reduce special legislation’s costs without eliminating its benefits altogether.
As a result, this Article is addressed to legislatures—both state legislatures
and Congress—rather than to state or federal courts.
I. SPECIAL LEGISLATION DEFINED
A statute that targets an individual or a small, identifiable group for
treatment that is not imposed on the population in general is often called
special legislation. 52 Although there is no universal definition, special legislation is most often defined as a statute that targets one, named person. 53

47. RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD
BEFORE 1825, at 19–20, 64 (1917) (describing the flood of petitions that tied up the legislative
process).
48. E.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 36–37 (1914); see also
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1331 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995).
49. E.g., BINNEY, supra note 46, at 6; GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 8; Ireland, supra note 46,
at 277–78.
50. E.g., GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7–10; Ireland, supra note 46, at 271–280; cf. BINNEY,
supra note 46, at 10, 174–75; Horack, supra note 46, at 113.
51. Gillette, supra note 46, at 631; Long, supra note 46, at 723; Zoldan, Reviving Legislative
Generality, supra note 23, at 688.
52. E.g., State ex rel. Atkins v. Lawler, 205 N.W. 880, 883 (N.D. 1925) (“[A] ‘special
law’ . . . relates only to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a ‘general
law,’ which applies to all things or persons of a class . . . .”); State ex rel. Pub. Welfare Comm’n v.
Cty. Court, 203 P.2d 305, 315 (Or. 1949) (“A special [law] . . . is only applicable to particular individuals or things.”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *86 (“Special or private acts operate upon
particular persons, and private concerns.”); see also THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE LAW,
PRIVILEGES PROCEEDINGS AND USAGES OF PARLIAMENT 824 (Gilbert Campion ed., 14th ed.
1946).
53. See ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. IV, § 110 (“A special or private law is one which applies
to an individual, association or corporation.”); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884)
(distinguishing a general law from a “special rule for a particular person or a particular case”);
CCI Entm’t v. State, 215 Md. App. 359, 396, 81 A.3d 528, 549 (2013) (holding that a “special
law is one that relates to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a general law
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Despite this rule of thumb, defining special legislation poses some difficulty. 54 Individualized legislation is often, 55 but not always, 56 considered special. Moreover, legislation that targets more than one person, like two accused co-conspirators 57 or a handful of corporations, 58 also can be
considered special, whether or not the statute specifically names its targets. 59
The definitional difficulty stems from the fact that all laws apply to
some class less than the total population. 60 Most of these laws are uncontroversial. For example, a law that taxes industrial property at a lower rate
than residential property treats some members of the population differently
than others. But, a targeted law like this is considered “general” rather than
special because the differences between industrial and residential property

which applies to all persons or things of a class.” (quoting Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor, 290 Md.
553, 567, 431 A.2d 663 (1981))).
54. LUCE, supra note 46, at 533 (noting that a law affecting one person may reflect a broad
policy and a law generally written may affect only a few individuals); MAY, supra note 52, at
826–27 (noting the challenge of determining whether a statute is for the public or private benefit
at the margins, but concluding that the distinction is useful); see Jeffrey Rosen, Class Legislation,
Public Choice and the Structural Constitution, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 184–85 (1997)
(discussing the challenge of distinguishing between class legislation and public interest legislation).
55. E.g., CCI Entm’t, 215 Md. App. at 397, 81 A.3d at 549 (identifying a law as special if “a
particular individual or business sought and received special advantages from the Legislature”);
Perry Civil Twp. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 51 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. 1943) (“A special
law is one made for individual cases . . . .”).
56. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977) (upholding a law singling out
former President Nixon because it created a “legitimate class of one”); General Motors Corp. v.
Dep’t. of Treasury, 803 N.W.2d 698, 713 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (“[A law] may be general within
the constitutional sense and yet, in its application, only affect one person or one place.” (quoting
Rohan v. Detroit Racing Ass’n, 22 N.W.2d 433, 441 (Mich. 1946))); Excise Bd. v. Lowden, 116
P.2d 700, 703 (Okla. 1941) (“[A] law may be general and yet have only one local application.”).
57. People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 381–82 (Colo. 2005) (statute creating class of two coconspirators violated prohibition on special legislation).
58. Opyt’s AMOCO, Inc. v. Vill. of S. Holland, 568 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ill. App. 1991) (“Special legislation confers a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to
the exclusion of others similarly situated.”).
59. City of Topeka v. Gillett, 4 P. 800, 804 (Kan. 1884) (“[Legislation] may be special where
it simply describes the particular persons or things so that they may be known, as well as where it
gives their particular names . . . .”); Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor, 290 Md. 553, 569, 431 A.2d
663, 673 (1981) (“[S]tatutory provisions which did not name particular individuals or entities have
been held to be prohibited special laws, whereas enactments naming specific entities have been
held not to be special laws.” (citations omitted)).
60. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 343–44 (1949). Jeremy Bentham made the same point a century ago: “If we were to lay
down as a principle that all men ought to enjoy ‘equal rights,’ we should thereby and of necessity
render legislation impossible: for the law is ever establishing inequalities, as it cannot bestow
rights upon some without, at the same time, imposing obligations upon others.” JEREMY
BENTHAM, 1 BENTHAM’S THEORY OF LEGISLATION 127–28 (Charles Milner Atkinson trans.,
1914).
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make the distinction “rational” or “reasonable.” 61 Classification becomes
controversial when the legislature appears to be conferring some unearned
benefit or levying some undeserved punishment. Legislation that singles
out an individual or a very small group in this way is often called special
legislation. 62
Two examples highlight some of special legislation’s less obvious features. First, consider “Terri’s Law,” the well-known statute enacted to resolve the fate of Terri Schiavo. After Schiavo suffered cardiac arrest and
fell into a persistent vegetative state, Schiavo’s parents and husband battled
over whether to withdraw her life support. 63 When a state court required
her hospice facility to withhold food and water, 64 Congress enacted a statute
allowing “any parent” of Terri Schiavo to bring suit in federal district court
to redress this decision. 65 Through Terri’s Law, Congress set aside the previous decade of state court litigation over Schiavo’s intentions, permitting
relitigation of previously adjudicated issues. The law was targeted to address Schiavo’s situation alone: it applied only to “any parent” of Schiavo
and specifically provided that it would not serve as a precedent for future
legislation. 66 Limited to one event and providing relief for two people only,
Terri’s Law afforded a special exemption from general preclusion rules that
apply to all other suits in district court.
Second, consider the statute that singled out a particular individual,
James Mattis, and provided that he was eligible to be appointed Secretary of
Defense. 67 This targeted statute was an explicit exception to the generally
applicable law, which provides that a person may not be appointed Secretary of Defense within seven years of being relieved from active duty as an
officer of the armed forces. 68 In Congress, the bill was introduced as “a
one-time exemption on behalf of an individual;” proponents candidly
acknowledged that the proposed legislation would not “permanently change
the law.” 69 To erase all doubt about the particularized nature of the statute,

61. See Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game Dep’t, 289 P.3d 32, 38
(Idaho 2012) (opining that if the state has a “legitimate interest” in enacting the targeted law, and
the classification is not “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,” it is not a special law).
62. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 23, at 496; see, e.g., Martin’s Ex’rs
v. Commonwealth, 102 S.E. 77, 80 (Va. 1920) (noting that special legislation often includes statutes “conferring special privileges and immunities, or special restrictions and burdens, upon particular persons or localities to the exclusion of other persons or localities similarly situated”).
63. Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59
U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 107–08 (2004).
64. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
65. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2, 119 Stat. 15, 15.
66. Id.; see Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 23, at 629.
67. Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, § 1, 131 Stat. 6, 6.
68. 10 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012).
69. 163 CONG. REC. H480 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2017) (statement of Rep. Newhouse).
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the statute itself provided that it was a “limited exception,” applying “only
to the first person appointed as Secretary of Defense” after the statute’s enactment and “to no other person.” 70
Both Terri’s Law and the Mattis waiver statute provide exceptions
from generally applicable laws for known individuals. A close look at these
statutes reveals a few of the peculiar attributes of special legislation. One,
although courts and commentators have declined to refer to targeted federal
statutes as special, federal statutes also can be tailored to affect a single individual or small group of known individuals. Under common definitions
of “special law,” 71 therefore, targeted federal laws like the Mattis waiver
statute and Terri’s Law should be considered special. 72
Two, like the Mattis waiver statute (or the Tesla Laws described in the
Introduction), a law can be tailored to affect a single person or company
without naming the target directly. Nevertheless, if the purpose or effect of
a statute is to single out a known individual for special treatment, courts often consider it special. 73
Three, like Terri’s Law, statutes can be targeted to reach a small number of people rather than a single individual. Terri’s Law, for example,
provided an exemption for “any parent” of Schiavo. But, even when a class
contains more than one person, when the class is defined to prevent individuals from entering or leaving the class in the future, courts often consider the legislation special. 74
Four, special legislation is broader than, and includes, “private legislation.” Private legislation is legislation introduced for the relief of a particular named individual. Unlike special legislation more generally, private legislation always names a particular individual, is titled “for the benefit” or
“relief” of a particular named party, 75 and, in Congress, is restricted under

70. § 1, 131 Stat. at 6.
71. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 110 (“A special or private law is one which applies to an
individual, association or corporation.”); Best v. Taylor Mach., Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1069
(Ill. 1997).
72. Indeed, the failure of federal courts to recognize targeted laws as special is surprising
because, for nearly a century, federal law explicitly prohibited federal territorial legislatures from
enacting special laws. Act of July 30, 1886, ch. 818, § 1, 24 Stat. 170, 170 (repealed 1983). During this time, federal courts invalidated special laws enacted by territorial legislatures. Smith v.
Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 240 F. Supp. 809, 810–11 (D.V.I. 1965).
73. See supra note 59.
74. People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 384 (Colo. 2005) (“By contrast, a class that is drawn so
that it will never have any members other than those targeted by the legislation is illusory, and the
legislation creating such a class is unconstitutional special legislation.”).
75. CHARLES W. JOHNSON ET AL., HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES, PRECEDENTS,
AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 166–67 (2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPOHPRACTICE-115/pdf/GPO-HPRACTICE-115.pdf (“A private bill is a bill for the benefit of one
or several specified persons or entities” as opposed to being for a public benefit); see, e.g., Priv. L.
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legislative rules applicable only to private laws.76 By contrast, many special laws, like the Mattis waiver (and Tesla Laws), are denominated as public laws despite their obviously targeted nature, do not name their target,
and are treated for procedural purposes as public laws.
Terri’s Law and the Mattis waiver statute are far from unique; Congress and state legislatures routinely enact special laws, including, in recent
years, statutes granting public funds to named individuals, 77 statutes exempting particular people from generally applicable laws, 78 and even statutes intervening in pending court cases to favor one of the litigants. 79
Whether the existence of special legislation is normatively attractive or not
depends on the costs it imposes and the benefits it provides. In Part II, I assess the costs of special legislation; in Part III, I assess its benefits.
II. THE COSTS OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION
Rather than addressing broad social problems, 80 establishing rules for
future lawmaking, 81 or vesting authority in other government actors, 82 all of
which provide stability and security to society, special legislation tends to
be destabilizing. Indeed, the threats to personal security, property rights,
and political equality created by special legislation were among the most
pressing concerns that prompted the framing of the federal Constitution. 83
Likewise, the corruption, favoritism, and inefficiency that accompanied
No. 112-1 (2012) (providing an exemption from the Immigration and Nationality Act for one
named person).
76. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XII, cl. 4, at 25 (2019) (prohibiting private bills related to pensions, bridges, military records, or money claims that are cognizable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act from being received or considered); see also STANDING RULES FOR
THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XIV, cl. 9–10, at 10 (2013) (same).
77. Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565
(2013) (transferring $174,000 to a named individual).
78. Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, § 1, 131 Stat. 6, 6; Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat.
4523 (2010).
79. Act of Sept. 26, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2, 128 Stat. 1913, 1913 (applying to one
particular piece of property); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1317 (2016) (upholding
a statute picking the winner in one particular, pending case); Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d
1198, 1204–08 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
80. For example, Jeremy Bentham described the purpose of legislation as “the happiness of
the body politic,” which included subsistence, abundance, equality, and security. BENTHAM, supra note 60, at 123; see also Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
411–12 (1983) (noting that a legitimate public purpose includes “the remedying of a broad and
general social or economic problem”).
81. Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES
717 (2005) (describing statutes that provide decision-making process for future legislation).
82. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369, 372 (1989) (“Modern legislation in its essence is an institutional practice by which the legislature . . . issues directives to the governmental mechanisms that implement that policy.”).
83. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995); CORWIN, supra note 48, at 36–
37, 62; EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 148–50 (1919).
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special legislation in the nineteenth century prompted states nationwide to
convene constitutional conventions. 84 Although not every special law imposes all of the costs described below, in the aggregate, a system that permits unrestricted special legislation encourages the following overlapping
harms: corruption of the legislative process; low-quality legislation; unjustifiably unequal treatment; and legislative encroachment on the judicial and
executive functions. This Part describes each of these costs.
A. Special Legislation Encourages Legislative Corruption
The power to enact special legislation allows lawmakers to create a
valuable public good that they can then trade for private gain. 85 Because
legislatures have the ability to confer great privileges on favored constituents, the power to enact special legislation permits legislatures to supply
special privileges that are demanded by motivated constituents. 86 This dynamic often results either in bribes to individual legislators to introduce and
support special bills or, even in the absence of bribery, special legislation to
benefit politically powerful or well-connected individuals.
First, special legislation often leads to bribery. When special legislation dominated state legislative practice in the nineteenth century, bribery to
secure the passage of special laws was widespread. 87 Contemporary observers noted that special legislation was “often pushed through the legislatures by unscrupulous men” 88 who exchanged special legislation for
bribes. 89 Some of these private bills required the purchase of worthless land
at extravagant prices solely to enrich landowners. Others required the improvement of streets without inhabitants “for no other purpose than to
award corrupt contracts for the work.” 90 Special laws “abolishing one of84. E.g., Horack, supra note 46, at 115; Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1070
(Ill. 1997).
85. GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS 148–49 (2006); Zephyr Teachout,
The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 373–74 (arguing that corruption includes “self-serving use of public power for private ends”).
86. Richard T. Boylan, Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying, 111
PUB. CHOICE 19, 25–27 (2002) (discussing supply and demand for private immigration bills and
their connection to corruption).
87. LUCE, supra note 46, at 548; Ireland, supra note 46, at 277–78.
88. BINNEY, supra note 46, at 6.
89. Maple Run at Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. 1996)
(special legislation prohibition “prevents lawmakers from engaging in the ‘reprehensible’ practice
of trading votes for the advancement of personal rather than public interests” (citing Miller v. El
Paso Cty., 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001 (1941))); LUCE, supra note 46, at 548 (special legislation is a
“prolific source of bribery and corruption”); Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 356 (special legislation is “fertile ground for log rolling and bribery”); Green, supra note 46, at 363 (“[L]obbying,
log-rolling, and corruption increase . . . when the legislature customarily passes local legislation.”).
90. GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 8.
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fice and creating another with the same duties” were enacted to transfer lucrative government jobs from one person to another. 91 And seekers of valuable and scarce special incorporation laws created “a political culture of
bribery and extortion” by competing with one another for these special privileges. 92
The phenomenon of bribery in exchange for special legislation is not
limited in time to the nineteenth century. In a series of scandals in the
1960s and 1970s, members of Congress were investigated, 93 indicted, 94
forced to resign, 95 and convicted 96 after allegations were made that they received bribes in exchange for introducing and supporting special legislation. In 1969, credible allegations that senators and their staff members had
accepted bribes in exchange for introducing hundreds of bills to protect
Chinese nationals from deportation prompted Senate hearings and a change
in Senate rules to make the special immigration bill process more transparent. 97 In the mid-1970s, a congressman from New Jersey was indicted for
accepting thousands of dollars from foreign nationals in return for sponsoring immigration bills to permit them to remain in the United States.98 After
these events, and years of allegations of bribery related to special immigration bills, the government orchestrated the notorious “Abscam” sting to
catch government officials involved in these activities. Abscam involved
FBI agents posing as representatives of two wealthy sheiks seeking to immigrate to the United States. 99 The agents offered the legislators money in
exchange for their promises to introduce private bills on behalf of the fictitious sheiks, 100 which some of the congressmen “readily accepted.” 101 In
all, twenty-five people, including one United States Senator, six United
States Representatives, and other public officials were indicted for corruption related to the investigation.102 Although most immigration legislation
91. Id. at 9.
92. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 90 (2018).
93. Immigration Bill Probe, 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 237 (1970).
94. Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE
L.J. 1565, 1574–75 (1982).
95. JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 260 (2017).
96. Id.; Gershman, supra note 94, at 1577–78.
97. Immigration Bill Probe, supra note 93, at 237; Three Branches Involved in Ethics Controversies, 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1021, 1025–26 (1969).
98. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 479, 484 (1979).
99. Gershman, supra note 94, at 1571–72.
100. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 692 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1982).
101. Gershman, supra note 94, at 1572.
102. MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL33024, PRIVATE IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION 8 (2007) (“Abscam, involving payoffs for the sponsorship of private immigration
laws, culminated in the expulsion of one Member of the House of Representatives . . . .”). Corruption related to private immigration laws has existed since before the ratification of the Consti-
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is surely not the product of bribery, the Abscam scandal, along with other
instances of bribery related to private bills,103 reveals how the ability of legislatures to enact special legislation creates a marketplace where special
privileges can be bought and sold.
Second, even in the absence of bribery, special legislation represents a
corruption of the legislative process because special benefit legislation is
enacted disproportionately for the benefit of powerful and politically wellconnected individuals. 104 Potential beneficiaries of special laws are motivated to procure special benefit legislation through legal exchanges, like
campaign contributions. A potential beneficiary of a special law is likely to
be more successful at procuring a special bill than the public is at opposing
it because an individual acting alone incurs no coordination costs and has a
goal that is simple to explain to legislators. As Professors John McGinnis
and Michael Rappaport explained, small but “well-organized . . . groups can
use their cohesive organizations to influence politicians and the political
process . . . to extract benefits from the nation.” 105 By contrast, although
the public in general is burdened by special legislation favoring one individual, the burden is diffuse, disincentivizing the public from forming a coalition to oppose the special legislation. 106 Moreover, because of coordination costs and free riders, it is more costly for large groups to form a
coalition than small groups; small groups, as a result, “have an advantage in
the competition for political influence.” 107 For example, imagine that
Company X is seeking a legislatively granted monopoly. Because the benetution. James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the
Early Republic, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 388 (2010) (private bills made immigration legislation “more
prone to corruption”).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing that a
legislative aid moved two private bills through the state legislative process in exchange for a
bribe); United States v. Oaks, 302 F. Supp. 3d 716, 719 (D. Md. 2018) (describing the indictment
of a state legislator for accepting a bribe in exchange for the introduction of special legislation).
104. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139, 1153 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter Jackson, Veto Message] (arguing that “exclusive privileges . . . make the rich richer and the potent
more powerful”); THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION *393–94 (5th ed.
1883) (noting that special laws tend to interfere with the principle that the state “has no favors to
bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights”); Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46,
at 357 (noting that special legislation is prone to provide special favors); Green, supra note 46, at
363 (recognizing that special legislation strengthens political “machine rule”); Ireland, supra note
46, at 281, 292; Schutz, supra note 46, at 45; Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1207–08 (1985).
105. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80
TEX. L. REV. 703, 735–36 (2002).
106. Id. at 737; Andrew McFarland, Interest Group Theory, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 37, 41 (L. Sandy Maisel & Jeffrey M.
Berry eds., 2010) (“[I]n the world of interest group politics . . . the few defeat the many.”).
107. GLENN PARKER, CONGRESS AND THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 30–31 (1996).
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fit of the special law would be concentrated on Company X, Company X
would have an incentive to obtain the legislation. Although granting the
monopoly to Company X could have a deleterious effect on the public welfare, the burden would be diffuse. Moreover, the costs of coordinating a
common, coherent response from the public could be high. As a result, the
public is less likely to organize for the purpose of blocking the monopoly
and a special bill is likely to pass even if it has no public purpose. 108
American history bears out this theory: during the American confederation period, 109 in the first years under the Constitution, 110 throughout the
nineteenth century, 111 and still today, 112 special legal exemptions and special financial benefits unavailable to the general public are often granted by
legislatures to the politically well-connected. Take, for example, the wellknown case of Baron von Steuben, who sought and received compensation
from Congress for debts incurred while fighting for the revolutionary cause
during America’s War of Independence. 113 Although he did incur debt in
the course of his wartime activities, Congress repaid him “far beyond what
had been done for the thousands of less prominent Americans who also sacrificed for the cause.” 114 His special legislation was not procured through
bribery; nevertheless, von Steuben’s case “was aided immeasurably by his
status as one of America’s few resident titled aristocrats and as a leader of
108. Id.
109. Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53, 55 (Conn. 1786) (upholding a special law protecting
one of two partners from liability); RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC
POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 120 (1979) (describing a gift of stock
made to George Washington by a special act); Jeffrey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Power: Gentility and Lobbying in the Early Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S 57,
95 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002) (describing that well-connected individuals are more likely to benefit from special legislation).
110. See Pasley, supra note 109, at 66–67 (describing self-interested lobbying under the new
Constitution).
111. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1070 (Ill. 1997) (“[S]pecial legislation
enriched particular classes of individuals at the expense of others.”); Yeoman v. Commonwealth,
983 S.W.2d 459, 466 (Ky. 1998) (“[T]he primary driving force behind the adoption of the 1891
Constitution was the fact that special interests were perceived as having carte blanche with the
General Assembly to achieve whatever legislation they desired.”); Clean Water Coal. v. M Resort,
LLC, 255 P.3d 247, 254 (Nev. 2011) (recognizing that constitutional prohibition comes from territorial legislature’s “practice of passing local and special laws for the benefit of individuals”); Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1088 (Pa. 2003) (adding a prohibition on special legislation to “put an end to the flood of privileged legislation” (quoting Haverford Twp. v. Siegle, 28
A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 1942))); Ireland, supra note 46, at 281, 292; Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution
of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUT. L.J. 1013, 1043–44 (2003) (explaining state prohibitions on special legislation enacted with a “desire to curb special privilege” (quoting JAMES
WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 241 (1950))).
112. See Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, § 1, 131 Stat. 6, 6 (creating a special exemption for General James Mattis); Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat.
558, 565 (2013) (transferring $174,000 to wife of deceased Senator).
113. Pasley, supra note 109, at 95.
114. Id.
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both high New York society and the Society of the Cincinnati.” 115 Similarly, when the Virginia Assembly purchased stock in George Washington’s
corporation formed to clear the Potomac River, the Assembly gave Washington a gift of the corporation’s stock worth $20,000, 116 a considerable
sum at that time. By contrast, the claims of less prominent citizens were often ignored during the same period. 117
B. A Special Legislation Leads to Low-Quality Lawmaking
A legislature’s ability and willingness to enact special legislation can
lead to low-quality lawmaking. Specifically, in jurisdictions in which it is
common, special legislation clogs the legislative machinery, crowds out
public-regarding legislation, and fails to provide guidance to the public.
First, when special legislation is common, it clogs the legislative machinery, 118 compromising the value of deliberation. Because special legislation concerns particular individuals rather than general policy, individuals
eagerly seeking special benefits can overwhelm legislatures with bills to
address the most minute of problems. 119 As early as the thirteenth century,
the English Parliament found itself suffering from an overabundance of petitions for special legislation. 120 Before it developed procedures for dealing
with private petitions, 121 Parliament was inundated with so many petitions
for private bills that it struggled to consider all of them. 122 Similarly, colo115. Id.
116. BAILEY, supra note 109, at 120.
117. William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View from the First
Federal Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S, supra note 109, at 29, 53 (contrasting well-connected Americans with ordinary Americans during the confederation period);
Pasley, supra note 109, at 96 (same).
118. LUCE, supra note 46, at 546.
119. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1995) (criticizing the confederation-era legislative habit of “extending their deliberations to the cases of individuals”);
GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7–8 (explaining that “innumerable” special laws “detract greatly
from the time and attention needed for general legislation”); Green, supra note 46, at 362 (noting
that special legislation leads to time “wasted on trivial matters”); see also DAVID DEAN, LAWMAKING AND SOCIETY IN LATE ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND: THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND, 1584–
1601, at 258 (1996) (noting that there was “never a shortage of people anxious to pursue private
matters” in Parliament in the 1500s); diGiacomantonio, supra note 117, at 32–33 (noting that early Congresses were routinely petitioned by industrial groups for “protectionist” special laws).
120. BAILEY, supra note 109, at 9.
121. Private petitions, requesting private relief, may be distinguished from common petitions,
which involved questions of public policy. BAILEY, supra note 109, at 10–11 (describing the
origin of “common petitions”); GWILYM DODD, JUSTICE AND GRACE: PRIVATE PETITIONING AND
THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 155 (2007) (distinguishing between private and common petitions).
122. BAILEY, supra note 109, at 9 (noting that private petitions occupied a “great deal of . . .
time” in Parliament); DEAN, supra note 119, at 217 (explaining that local and private legislation
“took up a good deal of time in every parliamentary session”); DODD, supra note 121, at 155 (describing how Parliament struggled to find time to devote to private petitions).
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nial American legislatures were flooded with petitions for special bills; in
the eighteenth century, they spent most of their time debating private matters and enacting special legislation. 123 After the revolution, early Congresses received “a flood of petitions” that threatened to grind congressional
business to a halt. 124 Like the colonial legislatures, early Congresses spent
“the principal part” of their time dealing with petitions for special legislation. 125
This trend continued into the twentieth century; in many years, “Congress enacted more private bills than it did public bills.” 126 For example,
between 1905 and 1907, Congress “enacted more than 6,000 private bills,
while it enacted fewer than 700 public bills.” 127 During this same period,
most state legislation was special. 128 To take just a few of the most egregious examples: ninety-five percent of Pennsylvania’s statutes were special; 129 in Missouri, eighty-seven percent; 130 and more than ninety percent
each in Kentucky 131 and Indiana. 132 Similar patterns existed in state legislatures throughout the country. 133 Indeed, between 1906 and 1907, state legislatures enacted some twenty-thousand special laws, roughly the same
amount passed by Great Britain’s Parliament during the entire nineteenth
century. 134
Because of the time necessary to deal with each bill, an abundance of
special bills interferes with the ability of legislatures to deliberate, which is
widely regarded as a normatively attractive goal of the legislative process,
either instrumentally or as a good in itself. 135 An overwhelming number of
123. RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD
BEFORE 1825, at 19–20, 64 (1917) (describing the flood of petitioning that tied up the legislative
process).
124. diGiacomantonio, supra note 117, at 30.
125. Christine A. Desan, Contesting the Character of the Political Economy in the Early Republic: Rights and Remedies in Chisolm v. Georgia, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790s,
supra note 109, 178, 200–01 (detailing the overwhelming number of petitions in early Congresses); Richard R. John & Christopher J. Young, Rites of Passage: Postal Petitioning as a Tool of
Governance in the Age of Federalism, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790s, supra note 109,
at 100, 107 (same).
126. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 75, at 176.
127. Id.; see also LUCE, supra note 46, at 545–46 (describing the large quantity of special laws
enacted by Congress).
128. LUCE, supra note 46, at 544.
129. Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1088 (Pa. 2003) (recounting levels of
special legislation in years prior to adopting a constitutional restriction on special legislation).
130. Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 356.
131. Id.
132. Horack & Welsh, supra note 46, at 192–93.
133. GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 8; Ireland, supra note 46, at 272.
134. LUCE, supra note 46, at 544.
135. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE
L.J. 1665, 1692 (2002) (noting that theorists emphasize, alternatively, the “instrumental value for
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bills imposes on the deliberative process by making it impossible for the
legislature to learn much about any of the bills with which it is presented. 136
Early Congresses, unable to investigate petitions for special legislation adequately, often enacted special laws without regard for the merits of the underlying claims. 137 The states’ experiences were similar. Representative of
the broader mood of the period, members of the 1897 Delaware Constitutional Convention noted “the flood of special bills” that inundated the
state’s legislature “and the consequent demands upon the time of the General Assembly upon matters with which the members could not be or become familiar.” 138 Indeed, nineteenth century state legislation was notable
for its lack of deliberation for this reason. When the steady stream of special legislation present from the early days of the republic widened into a
river by the middle of the nineteenth century, the volume of special legislation prevented state legislators from knowing much more about the bills
they enacted than the title. 139 So many special bills were enacted during
this period, and with such little deliberation, that legislatures sometimes
passed duplicate bills a few days apart, 140 bills in direct conflict with one
other, 141 and bills responding to requests without any, let alone adequate,
investigation into their merits. 142 Critics noted that this ill-considered spe-

good policy” and deliberation’s “intrinsic value to public life”); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving
and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1288 (2009) (“[R]easoned deliberation should facilitate tentative resolutions to specific policy questions that are more widely acceptable to a broader
range of interests . . . .”); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 959 (1983) (noting the value
of deliberation in lawmaking); JON ELSTER, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 8 (1998) (describing
some virtues of deliberation in democracy). For an argument about the value of deliberation and
guidance as lawmaking values, see Evan C. Zoldan, Congressional Dysfunction, Public Opinion,
and the Battle over the Keystone XL Pipeline, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 617, 622–25 (2015). As
scholars have noted, Congress does not live up to the ideal of a deliberative body. See e.g., Ittai
Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 863 (2010).
136. Wright v. Husbands, 131 A.2d 322, 332–33 (Del. 1957) (describing legislators’ lack of
knowledge of the merits of special bills).
137. Pasley, supra note 109, at 99 (noting that special laws were enacted, or not, without regard to their merits).
138. Wright, 131 A.2d at 332.
139. Ireland, supra note 46, at 272–73.
140. Id. at 273.
141. Id. at 278 (noting time spent harmonizing “discordant statutes”); Duke Power Co. v. S.C.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 326 S.E.2d 395, 400 (S.C. 1985) (“Recourse to local or special laws often
results in . . . laws, duplicative or conflicting, on the same subject.”).
142. GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7 (noting that special legislation is passed perfunctorily);
Green, supra note 46, at 364 (arguing that special legislation is enacted without proper consideration).
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cial legislation lacked meaningful deliberation,143 calling it “crude,” “careless,” “dangerous,” and “trash.” 144
Second, a superabundance of special legislation crowds out general
legislation addressing problems of public concern. 145 In the English Parliament, as early as the sixteenth century, petitions for private relief were
often a substitute for generally applicable laws. When private petitions increased, they competed with generally applicable laws for parliamentary
time. 146 As a result, even as Parliament evolved from a body that largely
settled private disputes into a national legislature that boldly asserted its authority over state affairs, it found its time taken up by a “multitude of requests” from private petitioners. 147 Acting on special laws derived from
these petitions “occupied so much time in the House of Commons that important public business was often delayed.” 148 Similarly, after the newly
independent American states began enacting special laws in great numbers,
James Madison lamented their habit of focusing on particular requests to
the exclusion of the “comprehensive and permanent interest of the State.”149
The problem of special legislation occupying time, political capital,
and energy that reduces the legislature’s ability to address general problems
only accelerated throughout the nineteenth century. During this period,
state legislatures devoted so much time and energy to special legislation
“that they lacked the time or the attention to enact general laws.”150 Rather
than focus on problems of general and statewide interest,151 legislators spent
143. Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm’n, 175 S.E.2d 805, 816 (S.C. 1970) (noting that
special legislation lacked deliberation “and the consideration of those problems which make for a
wise public policy” (quoting Tisdale v. Scarborough, 83 S.E.2d 594, 595 (S.C. 1914))).
144. Ireland, supra note 46, at 272–74.
145. See LUCE, supra note 46, at 542–43 (noting that legislators tend to consider the particular
at the expense of the general); Comment, Special Legislation Discriminating Against Specified
Individuals and Groups, 51 YALE L.J. 1358, 1370–71 (1942) [hereinafter Special Legislation Discriminating] (“[B]y occupying themselves with unimportant details of special legislation, legislative bodies tend to limit their effectiveness in laying down general rules on matters of policy.”).
146. DODD, supra note 121, at 155. Conversely, as generally applicable laws became more
prevalent, petitions for private relief decreased. Id. at 119–20, 135–36.
147. BAILEY, supra note 109, at 12.
148. Id. The problem of special laws crowding out public-regarding laws may have emerged
in England by the fourteenth century. Over the course of the 1300s, petitions once denominated
as private were instead filed as common petitions, presumably to gain more parliamentary traction. By the end of the 1300s, private petitions competed for Parliamentary time with common
petitions. DODD, supra note 121, at 155.
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
150. Ireland, supra note 46, at 279; see also GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7–8.
151. LUCE, supra note 46, at 541; Schutz, supra note 46, at 59; Special Legislation Discriminating, supra note 145, at 1370–71; see also Bonney v. Ind. Fin. Auth., 849 N.E.2d 473, 483 (Ind.
2006) (condemning special legislation “on the ground that attention to local issues diverted the
legislature from matters of concern to the general public”); Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 356
(noting the prevalence of “legislative attention being diverted from matters of important public
concern for frivolity”).
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their time resolving individual disputes. 152 The address convening the
Michigan constitutional convention is a typical statement of the problem
faced throughout the country: “The evils of local and special legislation
have grown to be almost intolerable, . . . consuming the time and energy of
the legislature which should be devoted to the consideration of measures of
a general character.”153 Similarly, both before and during his presidency,
Grover Cleveland railed against special legislation, denouncing state legislators for neglecting the “study and understanding of the important questions involved in general legislation” because they were focused on the
flood of special bills they encountered in office. 154
Among other social and economic problems that state legislatures
failed to address, many states chose to grant endless legislative divorces rather than reform antiquated divorce laws. It was not until legislative divorces were prohibited by state constitutional amendments that divorce by
judicial decree became the norm. 155 Similarly, as long as special incorporation statutes were lawful, they were demanded by seekers of special corporate privileges and supplied by legislatures. 156 The general incorporation
laws that did exist were a poor substitute for special incorporation laws because restrictions such as strict director liability made them an unattractive
alternative to special incorporation statutes. 157 It was not until special incorporation laws were prohibited by state constitutional amendments did
states pass effective general incorporation laws.158
152. See Mun. City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ind. 2003) (arguing that special legislation “has for years past engaged full three-fourths of the time of the General Assembly,
to the exclusion (from their due consideration) of many other questions of great importance to the
people of the State”); Fitzpatrick v. Greater Portland Pub. Dev. Comm’n, 495 A.2d 791, 794 (Me.
1985) (condemning special legislation for its tendency to “distract the attentions of legislators
from matters of public interest” (citation omitted)); see also Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at
356–57; Schutz, supra note 46, at 59.
153. Twp. of Casco v. Sec’y of State, 701 N.W.2d 102, 113 (Mich. 2005) (citing 2
PROCEEDINGS & DEBATES, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1907, at 1422–23).
154. THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF GROVER CLEVELAND 175 (George F. Parker ed., New
York, Cassell Publ’g Co. 1892).
155. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888) (“During the period of our colonial government, for more than one hundred years preceding the Revolution, no divorce took place in the colony of New York, and for many years after New York became an independent state there was not
any lawful mode of dissolving a marriage in the life time of the parties but by a special act of the
legislature.”); Ireland, supra note 46, at 289–90; see also LUCE, supra note 46, at 551–52 (describing the transition from legislative to judicial divorces).
156. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 512 (1985); Susan Pace Hamill,
From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of William Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 122–24 (1990).
157. Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 145–47 (1985); Charles M. Yablon, The Historical
Race: Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910,
J. CORP. L. 324, 331–32, 351–52 (2007).
158. Hamill, supra note 156, at 132.
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Third, legislative output that consists largely of special laws fails to
provide citizens with adequate guidance about the conduct that is required
of them. General laws, which provide common rules to deal with similar
situations, offer notice of what the law requires and guidance about how to
comply with the law. 159 Special laws compromise the value of guidance by
eliminating the coherence that makes law predicable, thereby denying even
reasonably well-informed citizens the ability “to steer between lawful and
unlawful conduct.” 160 In the early days of the republic, a common source of
discontent was the fact that special laws failed to provide guidance. In the
confederation period, state legislation was criticized for having “been altered—re-altered—made better—made worse; and kept in such a fluctuating position, that persons in civil commission scarce know what is law, or
how to regulate their conduct in the determination of causes.” 161 Surveying
the legislative ineptitude of the period, Madison denounced as inequitable
laws that are “so incoherent that they cannot be understood” or that are “repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant
changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it
will be to-morrow.” 162 Special legislation drew the same criticism in the
nineteenth century, when commentators observed that the proliferation of
special legislation meant that “no man knows what his rights are, much less
what they may be.” 163 Two cases, identical but for the interposition of a
special law, would be decided differently, “introducing uncertainty and confusion into the laws.” 164 As a result, neither average citizens, nor even lawyers, could become competent in the law’s requirements. A prominent
nineteenth century judge echoed Madison’s lament about special legislation
when noting that statutes within the city of New York “have been modified,
superseded and repealed so often and to such an extent that it is difficult to
ascertain just what statutes are in force at any particular time.” 165
C. Special Legislation Leads to Unjustifiably Unequal Treatment
By targeting individuals for special privileges or burdens, special laws
treat individuals differently in a way that cannot be squared with commonly

159. Frank Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 41, 46 (1937) (arguing
that legislation provides predictability and consistency, much like the common law).
160. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
161. VERMONT REPORT, supra note 25, at 68.
162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison).
163. Ireland, supra note 46, at 278; see also GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7–8.
164. Twp. of Casco v. Sec’y of State, 701 N.W.2d 102, 113 (Mich. 2005) (citing 2
PROCEEDINGS & DEBATES, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1907, at 1422–23)); see also supra
note 152.
165. GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 8.
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accepted visions of equality. 166 Special legislation offends the anticlassification conception of equality—associated with formal equality—by
according privileges or allocating burdens without regard to morally relevant characteristics. 167 Consider private immigration bills, like those that
were the subject of the Abscam sting. Even though the vast majority of
special immigration bills are not procured by bribery, and although very
few are enacted today, all special immigration bills grant their beneficiaries
special treatment not accorded to other applicants for legal resident status. 168 Moreover, like other private bills, private immigration bills are
passed with little or no debate; as a result, members of Congress do not
even discuss the merits of special immigration bills.169 Because special
immigration bills accord a benefit without reflecting a reason why one person rather than another was chosen, special immigration bills accord a special privilege without regard to any morally relevant characteristic.
Consider also the example of Terri’s Law, which exempted “any parent” of Terri Schiavo, and no one else, from generally applicable preclusion
rules. 170 Terri’s Law offends the anti-classification conception of equality
by making a distinction between Schiavo’s parents and others without regard to any morally relevant characteristic. Each year, countless individuals
are prevented from relitigating cases previously settled by state court judgments because of generally applicable preclusion rules. 171 And although
Schiavo’s circumstances were unusual, they were not unique: both proponents and opponents of Terri’s Law acknowledged that “thousands of people . . . face similar situations” as did Schiavo and her parents.172 By targeting Schiavo’s parents alone, and specifically providing that it would not
“constitute a precedent with respect to future legislation,”173 Terri’s Law
treated Schiavo’s parents differently than those thousands of similarly situated individuals without stating a morally relevant difference.
Special legislation also offends the anti-subordination vision of equality, a type of substantive equality, by perpetuating social stratification and

166. Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 823 (Okla. 1988) (“The vice of special acts is that they
create preferences and establish inequality.”).
167. See Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 23, at 513.
168. E.g., Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525
(2010).
169. HOW CONGRESS WORKS 85 (5th ed. 2013).
170. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2, 119 Stat. 15, 15–16.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (“The federal
courts generally have also consistently accorded preclusive effect to issues decided by state
courts.”).
172. 151 CONG. REC. S2926, S2928 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2005) (statements of Sen. Tom Harkin
& Sen. Ron Wyden).
173. § 7, 119 Stat. at 16.
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reinforcing social hierarchies. 174 Members of disfavored political minority
groups are often the targets of special legal burdens. During the revolutionary period, when political orthodoxy favored revolution, individuals accused of harboring Tory loyalties, but charged with no crime, were barred
from practicing their professions, 175 suffered the expropriation of their
property, 176 and even, albeit rarely, were sentenced to death 177 by special
bills. In the twentieth century, again, individuals suspected of heterodox
political views but not criminal activity were ordered deported 178 and denied government salaries 179 by special laws. More recently, individuals
suspected, but neither charged nor convicted, of violent crimes 180 or
fraud 181 have been the target of special laws that stripped them of legal
rights or government benefits without trial. In each of these cases, special
laws perpetuated social and legal hierarchies by penalizing members of
groups with a disfavored social status or heterodox political beliefs.
D. Special Legislation Compromises the Principle of Separation of
Powers
The principle of separation of powers is widely considered a safeguard
to liberty, 182 a predicate of accountable government, 183 and a bulwark
against tyranny. 184 When the legislature enacts special legislation, it un174. The anti-subordination conception of equality is concerned with the disestablishment of
tiers of favored and disfavored individuals. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note
23, at 505–06.
175. BAILYN, supra note 26, at 302; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71
(2001); W.P. Trent, The Case of Josiah Philips, 1 AM. HIS. REV. 444, 454 (1896).
176. E.g., An Act in Addition to an Act Intituled “An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Sundry
Persons Therein Named,” ch. 8 (1779), in 4 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 216, 216–18 (Henry Harrison Metcalf ed., 1916); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION
OF 1787, at 93 (1956); LEVY, supra note 175, at 70–71.
177. E.g., Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788); see also LEVY, supra note
175, at 71; Matthew Steilen, The Josiah Philips Attainder and the Institutional Structure of the
American Revolution, 60 HOW. L.J. 413, 427–28 (2017) (describing a Virginia bill attainting Josiah Philips).
178. H.R. 9766, 76th Cong. (1940); Maurice A. Roberts, The Harry Bridges Cases,
INTERPRETER RELEASES, Sept. 20, 1999, at 1385, 1387.
179. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305 (1946) (invalidating a statute denying salary to
specific federal employees).
180. Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1208–09 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
181. Acorn v. United States, 618 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2010).
182. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (noting that separation of powers
“serves . . . to secure individual liberty”); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1539 (1991) (recognizing that the protection of individual rights is
a “guiding principle” in issues involving separation of powers).
183. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742 (stating that separation of powers “serves . . . to make Government accountable”).
184. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756, (1996) (“Even before the birth of this
country, separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny.”); CHAFETZ, supra note
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dermines the principle of separation of powers by performing functions assigned to the judicial and executive branches.
The core of legislative power is to set generally applicable policies that
are applied by the courts and the executive in particular situations. 185 Indeed, this (admittedly simplified) explanation of separation of powers follows directly from Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Fletcher v. Peck: 186
“It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for
the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in
society would seem to be the duty of other departments.” 187 But, although
the contours of the powers of each of the branches has turned out to be
more fluid than Chief Justice Marshall suggested, 188 “the entire constitutional enterprise depends on there being” lines that separate the branches of
government. 189 Under most any view of the appropriate placement of those
lines, special legislation compromises the principle of separation of powers.
First, special legislation violates the principle of separation of powers
when it is used to decide live controversies by picking the winning and losing parties in particular, pending cases. In recent years, Congress has boldly asserted the authority to decide pending cases, both between private parties and between the government and private parties.190 In Bank Markazi v.
Peterson, 191 victims of terrorism, and family members and estate representatives of those victims, demonstrated that the republic of Iran was responsible for injuries and deaths caused by terrorist acts. 192 Because their judgments could not be satisfied by assets in the United States, 193 the claimants
brought suit against Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran. Under the

95, at 310–11 (“The multiple, overlapping, and nonhierarchical authority claims that the American
constitutional regime fosters help to ensure that no one branch is able to exert tyrannical control
over the nation.”); Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 329 (2010) (explaining that separation of powers is designed to avoid tyrannical government).
185. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1995); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that while the legislature has the power to “prescribe[] the rules by
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated . . . [t]he interpretation of the laws
is the proper and peculiar province of the courts”).
186. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
187. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
188. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (noting that the Constitution “enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))).
189. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1336 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
190. Id. at 1317 (upholding a statute, 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2012), that resolved dispute between
private parties); Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 903 (2018) (upholding an act, Pub. L. No. 113179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014), that resolved a dispute between the United States and a private party).
191. 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
192. Id. at 1319–20.
193. Id. at 1319–20, 1319 n.5, 1320 n.6.
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Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 194 however, a central bank could not be
reached to satisfy existing default judgments against the bank’s home country. 195 To avoid this result, Congress enacted the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 196 which permitted claims against Iran
under the FSIA to be satisfied by the assets of Bank Markazi. Specifically,
Congress provided that the “financial assets that are identified in . . . Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518” would
be available “to satisfy any judgment . . . awarded against Iran for damages
for personal injury or death caused by” acts of terrorism. 197 As this language of the Iran Threat Reduction statute makes clear, it applied only to
the particular, pending case against Bank Markazi.
More recently, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that terminated a particular, pending suit against the United States. Patchak v. Zinke 198 arose from the decision of the United States Department of the Interior
to take a plot of land, known as the Bradley Property, into trust. Patchak,
who owned land near the Bradley Property, brought suit challenging the legality of Interior’s decision. While the suit was pending, Congress enacted
a statute that declared Interior’s decision lawful and directed the federal
courts to dismiss all suits related to the Bradley Property. 199 The statutes at
issue in Bank Markazi and Patchak are not unique; Congress frequently has
enacted statutes targeted to resolve live disputes,200 including determining
the outcome of particular pending cases identified in statutory language. 201
Second, special legislation interferes with the judicial process when it
declares guilt and decides questions concerning legal rights and obligations.
The most well-known special laws, bills of attainder, assign guilt outside of
the judicial process. During the revolutionary period, the newly independent state legislatures enacted countless bills of attainder. 202 These bills, by
declaring their target guilty and ordering punishment, including banishment

194. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2012).
195. Id. § 1611(b)(1); Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.
196. 22 U.S.C. §§ 8701–8795 (2012).
197. Id. § 8772(a)(1)(C), (b).
198. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
199. Id. at 903–04 (citing Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128
Stat. 1913 (2014)).
200. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095, 2095–96
(2005) (requiring immediate dismissal of pending lawsuits against manufacturers or sellers of
firearms); New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act); Nat’l Coal. to Save our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092,
1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding an act, Pub. L. No. 107-11, 115 Stat. 19 (2001), that applied to a
single location); see Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 23, at 2172 (discussing statutes that direct
the result in particular, pending cases).
201. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 433 (1992).
202. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 23, at 662.
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or even death, substituted legislative judgment for court determinations
without indictment, rules of evidence, confrontation of witnesses, juries, or
even meaningful deliberation. The revolutionary-era case of Josiah Philips
is instructive. When authorities in Virginia were unable to apprehend
Philips, who was believed to have “commanded an ignorant disorderly
mob,” the Virginia Assembly attainted Philips of high treason 203 after declaring that he had “levied war against this commonwealth.” 204 And what
of judicial process? The act attainting Philips was designed specifically to
avoid it, stating that the statute would obviate “the delays which would attend the proceeding to outlaw the said offenders, according to the usual
forms and procedures of the courts of law.” 205 A decade later, while considering the Constitution, Patrick Henry, governor at the time of Philips’ attainder, defended the decision. 206 Philips, declared Henry, was not entitled
to “beautiful legal ceremonies” (that is, indictment, a trial, rules of evidence, and confrontation of witnesses against him) because he was popularly known to be “a fugitive murderer and outlaw.” 207 Philips was not entitled to legal process, Henry argued, because he had not been “a
Socrates.” 208
Bills of attainder are largely a thing of the past; 209 but other special
laws, like the statutes considered in Bank Markazi and Patchak, also continue to assign legal rights and obligations outside of, or in disregard of, the
judicial process, interfering “in cases where individual rights are concerned,
and where parties have no opportunity of being properly represented and
heard.” 210 Legislatures enacting special laws have interfered with judicial

203. Trent, supra note 175, at 445. For a recent historical study of the case of Josiah Philips,
see Steilen, supra note 177.
204. An Act to Attaint Josiah Philips and Others, Unless They Render Themselves to Justice
Within a Certain Time, ch. 12 (1778), in 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF
ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR
1619, at 463–64 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, J. & G. Cochran 1821).
205. Id.; see also Steilen, supra note 177, at 426 (arguing that bills of attainder can be considered a summary legal procedure without the confrontation of witnesses or the presentation of testimonial evidence).
206. Trent, supra note 175, at 449.
207. LEVY, supra note 175, at 75; 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 140 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter 3
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (statement of Patrick Henry).
208. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 207, at 140; PLATO, THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES 30–
31, 18c–d (D.F. Nevill trans., F.E. Robinson & Co. 1901) (suggesting that the execution of Socrates was unjust).
209. Largely, but not completely. See Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1203 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
210. Friedman, supra note 46, at 440–41 (quoting 2 THE DEBATE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND 878 (Annapolis, Richard P. Bayly 1864)).
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processes by nullifying judgments already rendered, 211 granting new trials
or extraordinary rights of appeal to losing parties,212 suspending the enforcement of judgments, 213 clothing particular individuals with civil immunity, 214 providing immunity for individuals from criminal prosecution, 215
creating special trial procedures directed to specific cases,216 and transferring title to property between private parties. 217
Third, special legislation also imposes on separation of powers values
by encroaching on the role of the executive. When the legislature passes
generally applicable laws, the executive branch executes these laws by applying them to particular factual situations. For example, administrative
agencies implement generally applicable laws by adjudicating individual
disputes within their authority. Similarly, prosecutors bring charges under
the generally applicable laws—or decline to do so—against specific parties
for specific conduct. When the legislature designs a law to target an individual, it usurps this role.
The recent, high-profile battle over the Keystone XL Pipeline illustrates special legislation’s intrusion into the role of the executive. Under
generally applicable law, when a company applies for a permit to engage in
cross-border energy-related transactions, administrative agencies must review the pertinent facts and the applicable law to determine whether the
company is eligible for the permit. 218 By contrast, the Keystone XL Pipeline Act of 2015, 219 which was passed by Congress but ultimately vetoed by
the President, provided that TransCanada’s application to build a pipeline
from Canada into the United States was deemed “to fully satisfy” the requirements of “any . . . provision of law that requires Federal agency consultation or review.” 220 By singling out a particular company and exempting it from laws that apply to all other companies, the Keystone legislation
exempted TransCanada from the process of executive review for compli-

211. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–21(1995); see VERMONT REPORT,
supra note 25, at 60–70.
212. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219–20; United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404–
05 (1980).
213. VERMONT REPORT, supra note 25, at 69.
214. Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53, 53–54 (Conn. 1786); VERMONT REPORT, supra note
25, at 66.
215. VERMONT REPORT, supra note 25, at 70.
216. Ireland, supra note 46, at 288–89 (noting special laws that changed venue and created
other special trial procedures).
217. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 24, at 41; Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct.
1310, 1319–20 (2016).
218. Exec. Order No. 13337, 3 C.F.R. § 13337 (2004) (setting out procedures for the issuance
of permits for energy-related facilities engaged in cross-border transactions).
219. S. 1, 114th Cong. (2015).
220. Id. § 2(b)(2); see Zoldan, supra note 135, at 629.
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ance with generally applicable laws.221 When it enacts special legislation,
like the Keystone pipeline measure, Congress impinges on the constitutional principle of separation of powers by assuming the power to apply the law
in derogation of the responsibilities of the executive branch. 222
III. IN DEFENSE OF SPECIAL LAWS
Not all special laws lead to all of the costs described above. Moreover, some special legislation is an uncontroversial way to deal with problems that are not or cannot be addressed by generally applicable laws. Specifically, special legislation sometimes addresses the needs of particular
geographic locations, supports a public purpose, cures disuniformities created by the generally applicable laws, or provides relief for underrepresented political minorities.
A. Special Laws Can Address Local Problems
Formal equality suggests that the law should treat two things the same
only if they are “similarly situated,” that is, if they are the same in a relevant way. 223 Special legislation is justified by a formal conception of equality, therefore, when the subject of the legislation is not similarly situated to
anything else. Consistent with this vision of equality, legislatures often enact special legislation treating particular geographic locations—like cities,
counties, or other municipal subdivisions—uniquely; 224 this type of legislation is often called local legislation.225 For example, a law providing a rule
221. S. 1; see also Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Feb. 24, 2015).
222. Legislatures have also impinged on the executive power by enacting special laws pardoning individuals convicted of crimes. VERMONT REPORT, supra note 25, at 60–70.
223. Determining whether two things are similarly situated is notoriously difficult. For a discussion of problems surrounding this determination, see Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 23, at 538–40. See also CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS22450, PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE LAWS ENACTED: 1986–2013, at 1 (2013) (“Private legislation is premised on the idea that general law cannot cover all situations equitably, and
sometimes Congress must approve legislation to address unique problems . . . .”).
224. Wilson v. Weiss, 245 S.W.3d 144, 146 (Ark. 2006) (invalidating an act applying to one
city); Leighton v. City of Minneapolis, 25 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1946) (“The fact that there is
but one city in the state to which the act presently applies does not make the act special legislation.”); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. City of Columbia, 165 S.E.2d 272, 275 (S.C. 1969) (invalidating a statutory distinction between cities with 70,000 residents and cities with 90,000 residents).
225. BINNEY, supra note 46, at 24–26; Price v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 331 P.3d 356, 359–
60 (Alaska 2014) (describing a constitutional ban on special or local legislation). The terminology
in this area of the law is used inconsistently by courts and commentators. BINNEY, supra note 46,
at 21–26; Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 366. Local laws are sometimes conflated with special
laws. See e.g., Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251, 1259 (Ariz. 1990) (invalidating a statute applying to select cities as “special or local” laws). Other times, local laws are
considered neither special nor general. See, e.g., Weiss, 245 S.W.3d at 152 (distinguishing be-
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for cities of a certain population can be considered local if, in fact, only one
city in the state has that population. 226 Unlike the special laws described
above, local laws have often been defended on the ground that they address
issues that are peculiar to the location where they apply. Every community
has characteristics that distinguish it from others, including differences in
wealth, population density, and the need for sanitation, police, and fire services. 227 Some areas of a state require more paved roads than others; some
counties have hills that require tunnels, and others have rivers that require
bridges. Moreover, different localities may have different preferences
about how state money should be allocated and how their local governments should be structured. 228 In short, laws addressed to particular political subdivisions within the state can be justified by the differences between
them. As a corollary, because problems addressed by local laws do not
concern the entire state, a statewide rule is not appropriate to address a
uniquely local problem.
An Arizona case illustrates why commentators 229 and courts 230 have
been more sympathetic to local laws than to special laws more generally. In
Gallardo v. State, 231 a generally applicable law divided the state into community college districts, each of which was governed by a five-member
governing board. 232 The state amended the generally applicable law by
adding two members to the governing board of any “county with a population of at least three million persons.” 233 Although written generally, this
law had only local effect. At the time it was written, only one county met
the population threshold and the court found that no other county was even
close to reaching it. 234 Despite the exclusively local effect, and the state’s
constitutional prohibition on local laws, 235 the court upheld the statute on
the ground that there was a rational relationship between the size of a county and the size of its community college governing board. 236 The court nottween local and special laws); see also MAY, supra note 52, at 831, 828–30 (describing that local
laws are sometimes considered public, other times private).
226. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 165 S.E.2d at 275 (invalidating a statute’s distinction between
cities with 70,000 residents and cities with 90,000 residents).
227. Horack & Welsh, supra note 46, at 183–85.
228. COOLEY, supra note 104, at *389–90.
229. BINNEY, supra note 46, at 10, 174–175; Horack, supra note 46, at 113.
230. Mode v. Beasley, 42 N.E. 727, 729 (Ind. 1896) (praising the legislature for its “laudable
desire to pass much needed local laws”); Yant v. City of Grand Island, 784 N.W.2d 101, 108–09
(Neb. 2010) (upholding a local law); Bray v. Cty. Bd., 77 S.E.2d 479, 483–84 (Va. 1953) (upholding a statute although it applies to only one geographic area).
231. 336 P.3d 717 (Ariz. 2014).
232. Id. at 719–20.
233. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-1441(I) (2010)).
234. Id.
235. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 19.
236. Gallardo, 336 P.3d at 722.
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ed that a populous county is likely to have a large student population and,
therefore, warrant a larger board to govern it. 237 Like Gallardo, courts routinely uphold local laws on the ground that the locality singled out possesses unique attributes that justify particularized treatment. 238
B. A Special Law May Have a General Purpose
A perennial cost of special legislation is its tendency to avoid problems of general concern and instead provide exclusive, unearned privileges
to favored individuals 239 or impose undeserved burdens on disfavored individuals. 240 But, sometimes a law tailored to reach an individual has a general purpose. Legislation that is tailored to an individual person, including
an individual corporation, is often not regarded as special so long as it relates to a matter of general concern. 241 Consider a Utah statute enacted to
avert an emergency threatened by rising water levels in the Great Salt Lake.
The Great Salt Lake Causeway, a raised bed of landfill that divides the lake,
prevented the water levels in the separate arms of the lake from equalizing.
When rising water levels in one arm of the lake threatened to flood adjacent
land, the owner of the causeway, the Southern Pacific Railway, agreed to
breach the causeway to prevent further flooding. 242 Because breaching the
causeway would inundate and destroy underwater mining operations that
were conducted pursuant to a lease with the railway, the state enacted a law
indemnifying the railway from liability arising from the destruction of the
leased land. 243 The indemnification provision, as the Utah Supreme Court
later noted, applied only to one piece of land and provided the benefit of indemnification for one entity alone. 244 Despite the targeted nature of the
law, the purpose of the law, to mitigate flooding damage, was to advance
the public interest.
237. Id.
238. See Lamasco Realty Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 8 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wisc. 1943) (upholding a statute that applied only to Milwaukee because of the city’s unique characteristics); Elliott v.
Fuqua, 204 S.W.2d 1016, 1017 (Tenn. 1947) (upholding a statute that applied only to one county).
239. Jackson, Veto Message, supra note 104, at 1153; COOLEY, supra note 104, at *392–93;
Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 357; Horack & Welsh, supra note 46, at 183; Ireland, supra note
46, at 279; Schutz, supra note 46, at 45; Williams, supra note 104, at 1207–08; Zoldan, The Equal
Protection Component, supra note 23, at 511–14.
240. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 309 (1946); Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d
1198, 1204–08 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Roberts, supra note 178, at 1387; Steilen, supra note 177, at 426.
241. Price v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 331 P.3d 356, 360–62 (Alaska 2014) (upholding targeted provision because it addressed a matter of general concern); Tusso v. Smith, 156 A.2d 783,
787–88 (Del. Ch. 1959) (same); In re Pub. Act 619 of the Pub. Acts of 2002 v. State, No. 257500,
2005 WL 659654, at *7,*8 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2005) (same); Associated Gen. Contractors
of S.D., Inc. v. Schreiner, 492 N.W.2d 916, 924–25 (S.D. 1992) (same).
242. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 636 (Utah 1990).
243. Id. at 623–24.
244. Id. at 636.
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Drawing the same distinction between special privileges or burdens
and, on the other hand, statutes of general concern, courts routinely uphold
targeted legislation when finding that it addresses matters that touch the
public interest. This special legislation includes statutes prohibiting fishing
in a particular stream, 245 reorganizing a particular school district, 246 permitting gambling in a particular location, 247 granting funds to particular counties, 248 creating a particular public interest corporation, 249 and, most famously, if uniquely, confiscating the papers of former President Nixon. 250
C. A Special Law May Enhance Rather Than Impair Uniformity
Special laws are often criticized for creating disuniformity in the
law, which not only introduces unjustifiable inequalities, but also compromises the ability of the law to provide notice and guidance. However,
not all laws that target particular individuals create or exacerbate disuniformity. First, a targeted statute repealing the special treatment created by a
special law enhances rather than impairs uniformity. 252 A Kansas statute
illustrates this principle: a generally applicable statute fixed the compensation of state officers; in derogation of this generally applicable law, the state
granted a higher rate to probate judges in a particular, named county
through special legislation. 253 A subsequent statute repealed the special
law, returning the pay structure of the judges to the generally applicable
rate. This latter statute was challenged as a special law; and indeed, as the
251

245. Morgan v. State, 470 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (upholding a statute regulating fishing in a particular area because of the state’s interest in preserving fish in coastal waters).
246. Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1088 (Pa. 2003) (upholding a statute taken by the state to “fulfill its duties connected with the public interest”).
247. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So.2d 1128, 1133–34, 1136 (La. 1993) (upholding a law permitting
gambling in particular locations because of state-wide interest).
248. Bonney v. Ind. Fin. Auth., 849 N.E.2d 473, 482 (Ind. 2006) (upholding allocations of
funds to particular counties because of state-wide interest).
249. Utah Farm Bur. Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 564 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1977).
250. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 459, 477 (1977) (upholding a statute seizing papers and tapes of former President Nixon because of public interest in preserving these materials for historical purposes and for pending Watergate-related prosecutions).
251. State v. Lake Superior Ct., 820 N.E.2d 1240, 1248 (Ind. 2005) (noting that the purpose of
including special legislation provision in state constitution was to address the lack of uniformity in
state tax laws); Bd. of Trs. v. State, 761 S.E.2d 241, 246 (S.C. 2014) (Beatty, J., dissenting) (“The
purpose of the prohibition on special legislation is to make uniform where possible the statutory
laws of this State . . . .” (quoting Med Soc’y of S.C. v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 513 S.E.2d 352, 357
(S.C. 1999))); 54 Wis. Op. Att’y. Gen. 3, 7 (1965) (recognizing that the purpose of special legislation restrictions is to promote uniformity).
252. People ex rel. Rogerson v. Crawley, 113 N.E. 119, 121 (Ill. 1916) (“This court has never
held any act unconstitutional, under this section, which tended to uniformity rather than to create
differences . . . .”); Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 361, 377 n.130.
253. State ex. rel. Jackson v. Prather, 112 P. 829, 830 (Kan. 1911).
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court noted, it was special in a sense because it did single out one county’s
probate judges. Nevertheless, the court held that the repealing statute was
“not within the reason or the spirit of the rule against special legislation”
because it would “reduce the number of counties governed by special acts”
by subjecting the county, previously governed by a special act, to the generally applicable law. 254 In other words, the court upheld the statute because it enhanced rather than reduced uniformity by placing the county’s
probate judges under the rule generally applicable to state officers. With
this same goal, some state constitutions explicitly permit special laws enacted to repeal other special laws. 255
Second, uniformity is enhanced by a targeted statute that seeks to ensure that like situations are treated alike, eliminating disuniformity created
by the generally applicable laws. 256 Laws that seek to cure disuniformity
created by the general laws are often called “curative” laws and upheld despite their targeted nature. 257 In O’Brian v. County Commissioners of Baltimore County, 258 a typical case upholding a targeted law as curative, a state
agency awarded a contract to build a particular road pursuant to a generally
applicable statute. 259 While the road was in progress, but before it was
complete, the legislature repealed the generally applicable law. 260 The legislature apparently wanted the road-in-progress to be finished. Nevertheless, because the state legislature did not provide a savings clause in its repealer statute, no state agency had the authority to pay for the completion of
the road. In order to correct this oversight, the legislature enacted a new
statute, naming the road-in-progress and authorizing payment for its completion. 261 The law was challenged as prohibited special legislation. The
court upheld the statute, noting that the targeted statute was intended to be
“curative”; that is, it was intended to remedy the mischief created by the repeal of the generally applicable road authorization law without providing
for the completion of roads-in-progress. 262 As a result, the statute was not

254. Id. at 831.
255. MO. CONST. art. III, § 41; PA. CONST. art. III, § 32; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 23.
256. DAVIS, supra note 222, at 1 (noting that private legislation is designed to address “problems that public law either created or overlooked”).
257. BINNEY, supra note 46, at 174–75; Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 377; see City of
Muscatine v. Waters, 251 N.W.2d 544, 548, 550 (Iowa 1977) (upholding a targeted statute because it seeks “to cure or validate errors or irregularities in legal or administrative proceedings”)
(quoting McSurely v. McGrew, 118 N.W. 415, 419 (Iowa 1908))); Weber v. City of Helena, 297
P. 455, 466 (Mont. 1931) (upholding curative statute against challenge as special law).
258. 51 Md. 15 (1879).
259. Id. at 20–21.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 23.
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prohibited as a special law. 263 The statute in O’Brian, although targeted to
a specific road, did not create disuniformity. Rather, the statute arguably
encouraged uniformity by ensuring that the contractor who had contracted
with the state to build the road would be treated like all previous contractors
with the state; that is, he would be paid for his work. 264
Third, a statute that changes the law for a known individual may enhance uniformity if it also serves as a model for future cases. A legislature
sometimes enacts a statute to govern future behavior that also applies to behavior that already has occurred. This is often the case when, in response to
a particular event, the legislature passes a statute that addresses both that
particular event and anticipated future conduct. If this new statute applies
prospectively only, it would create disuniformity between future cases and
the pending case that prompted the legislative response. However, if it applies retrospectively to include the pending case that prompted the change
in law, it would apply uniformly to pending and future cases. Notably, the
first Congress enacted a number of statutes that created a rule encompassing
both named individuals and similar potential future cases. For example,
Congress granted death benefits to a particular, named widow and orphan
of soldiers killed during the Revolutionary War. 265 In the same statute,
Congress also provided that “the widow or orphan of each officer, noncommissioned officer, or soldier, who was killed or died whilst in the service of the United States” was entitled to a pension on the same terms as
provided to the named beneficiaries. 266 Although the statute singled out
beneficiaries by name, the statute did not impair uniformity; instead, it ensured that there would be uniformity between the current, named beneficiaries and any similar beneficiaries that come into existence in the future. 267
D. Special Laws Can Provide Relief for Underrepresented Individuals
While special benefit legislation concentrates benefits on a single individual, the corresponding costs tend to be diffused throughout a large, dis263. Id.
264. Id. at 25–26. The first Congress similarly ensured that like situations would be treated
alike in the case of the Baron de Glaubeck, a German soldier who fought with the United States
Army, earning a commission as captain without pay. JAMES GRAHAM, THE LIFE OF GENERAL
DANIEL MORGAN 311 (New York, Derby & Jackson 1859); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and
the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 701–02 (2003). Congress enacted a special law
granting “the pay of a captain in the army of the United States” to the Baron de Glaubeck. Act of
Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 26, 6 Stat. 1. However, far from providing special treatment to de Glaubeck,
the statute provided that he was to be paid “in the same manner as other foreign officers in the
service of the United States ha[d] been paid.” Id.
265. Act of Aug. 11, 1790, ch. 45, §§ 1–2, 4, 6 Stat. 4, 4–5.
266. § 4, 6 Stat. at 5.
267. See also MacImage of Me., LLC v. Androscoggin Cty., 40 A.3d 975, 989 (Me. 2012)
(applying a new rule to a pending case despite a constitutional prohibition on special legislation).
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organized, heterogeneous group. As a result, even if a special law lacks
powerful supporters, opposition to special legislation tends to be weak. 268 It
is precisely because opposition to special benefit legislation tends to be
weak that it can be promoted successfully not only to aggrandize the
wealthy and well-connected, 269 but also to provide relief for political minorities who are unrepresented in, or excluded from, the political process. 270 In
colonial Virginia, the General Assembly would consider petitions for special bills not only from the wealthy and well-connected, but also from
women, the poor, prisoners, free blacks, and even slaves. 271 The General
Assembly’s willingness to consider and occasionally enact special bills for
individuals who could not vote or hold political office was a strikingly
democratic feature in an otherwise hierarchical society. Indeed, social rank
did not seem to influence whether the General Assembly enacted a special
bill in response to a petition. 272 In one notable example, a group of free
black men successfully petitioned for an exemption from certain taxes.273
A modern analog is special immigration legislation. Congress has enacted more than 7,000 special immigration bills, 274 the vast majority of
which provided relief for individuals who were not politically wellconnected. Historically, most private immigration bills have been enacted
for otherwise underprivileged individuals, like orphans adopted by citizens
of the United States, war brides and children of United States servicemen,
and displaced persons or refugees. 275 Special immigration legislation procured by bribery for the benefit of the politically well-connected 276 is the
exception to this general pattern.
IV. A BETTER APPROACH TO SPECIAL LEGISLATION
In light of the foregoing, it would be hasty to characterize special legislation as uniformly beneficial or costly. It can impose significant costs on
society, to be sure; but, in other circumstances, it can also provide benefits.
268. See PARKER, supra note 107, at 30–31 (1996) (“[N]umerically large, diffuse interest
groups normally will not be effective bidders for public policies, and small groups will have an
inordinate amount of influence.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public
Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 86–87 (1990) (“Interest groups that are small, single-minded, and
well-organized tend to convey their messages more clearly than large interest groups with diverse
agendas. This produces a significant bias in the legislative process in favor of smaller, more efficient special interest groups.”).
269. See Jackson, Veto Message, supra note 104, at 1153.
270. BAILEY, supra note 109, at 42–43.
271. Id. at 10, 42–45, 166–67.
272. Id. at 42–43.
273. Id. at 44.
274. See LEE, supra note 102, at 2.
275. Id. at 8.
276. Gershman, supra note 94, at 1571–72.
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As a result, neither a blanket prohibition on special legislation nor a blind
eye toward it is likely to produce optimal societal results. Instead, it is
preferable to attempt to formulate rules to govern the enactment of special
legislation that will reduce its costs without completely eliminating its benefits. 277 This Part advocates a better approach to special legislation by proposing legislative procedures designed to discourage costly special legislation without eliminating its benefits. Both the chambers of Congress 278 and
the chambers of state legislatures 279 have the power to adopt the changes
proposed in this Part under their power to write rules governing their proceedings. As a result, the proposals in this Part are addressed to legislatures—both state legislatures and Congress—rather than to courts.
A. Three Caveats Before Suggesting Legislative Modifications
Before I suggest how legislatures can modify their internal rules, three
caveats are in order. First, by proposing changes to legislative rules, I
acknowledge that the enforcement of these proposals relies on the willingness of legislative chambers to adopt these restrictions and enforce them in
particular cases. I am optimistic that legislatures would be willing to adopt
and adhere to rules related to special legislation because the chambers of
Congress already have adopted rules related to private legislation (a subset
of special legislation) and earmarks (a close analog of special legislation),
have generally observed these rules, and have adopted a mechanism for resolving difficult questions about their application.
House and Senate rules prohibit either chamber from considering private bills in certain circumstances 280 and restrict their consideration in oth-

277. For an argument that prohibitions on special legislation should be understood to help
eliminate costly logrolling, see Gillette, supra note 46, at 642.
278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”);
see also JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 588
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873) (“No person can doubt the propriety of the provision
authorizing each house to determine the rules of its own proceedings. If the power did not exist, it
would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with
decency, deliberation, and order.”).
279. State constitutions have provisions that mirror the federal Constitution’s rules of proceedings clause. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 53 (“Each house shall have power to determine the rules
of its proceedings . . . .”); ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 12 (“The houses of each legislature shall
adopt uniform rules of procedure.”); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a) (“Each house shall . . . adopt
rules for its proceedings.”). Moreover, even in the absence of an express constitutional grant, state
legislatures would have the power to write their own rules of procedure. H. W. Dodds & John A.
Lapp, Procedure in State Legislatures, 77 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. (SUPP.) 1, 12–13
(1918); see also CHAFETZ, supra note 95, at 277–78 (describing colonial and early state legislative sources of authority to write procedural rules).
280. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XII, cl. 4, at 25 (2019); STANDING
RULES FOR THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XIV, cl. 10, at 10 (2013).
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ers. 281 Despite the fact that both chambers frequently pass special legislation that is not covered by their rules, they have consistently refused even to
consider private legislation when doing so would violate chamber rules. 282
For example, both House and Senate rules specifically prohibit the correction of military records by private bill. 283 When a private bill was introduced in the Senate to alter the military records of a particular former serviceman, the presiding officer sustained a point of order lodged against
consideration of the bill, ruling that the prohibition was intended “to put a
definite termination to the introduction of private bills for the correction of
military records.” 284 As a result, he ruled, “the bill proposed by the able
Senator cannot be received.” 285 Similarly, points of order have been sustained against amendments to private bills because they would have violated chamber rules, including amendments that were not germane, 286 impermissibly general, 287 and pro forma. 288
Similarly, both chambers of Congress have adopted restrictions on
earmarks. 289 There has been a great deal of debate concerning whether the
reduction of earmarks has reduced federal spending or, instead, whether directed spending still happens in more informal ways, such as through “lettermarking.” 290 Although the debate is still ongoing, initial political science
281. E.g., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XV, cl. 5, at 29 (setting rules for
consideration of bills on the private calendar).
282. 7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 22, §§ 11.10, 13.7–.8, at 4497,
4505–06 (1994); 7 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS, ch. CCXII, § 860, at 69–70 (1936). A special thanks
to Christopher Davis for helping me think through this issue.
283. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XII, cl. 4, at 25; STANDING RULES OF
THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XIV, cl. 10, at 10.
284. 93 CONG. REC. 905 (1947).
285. Id.
286. 7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 22, §§ 13.7–.8, at 4505–06.
287. 7 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS, ch. CCXII, § 860, at 69–70; 7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS,
H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 22, § 13.8, at 4506.
288. 7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 22, § 13.16, at 4510; see also
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 75, at 178, 719 (noting that private bills have been recommitted when
two members object to its consideration); 7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch.
22, § 11.10, at 4497 (noting that private bills called up on the wrong day have been ruled ineligible for consideration).
289. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XXI, cl. 9, at 36 (2019); STANDING
RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XLIV, cl. 6, at 69 (2013). In addition to these
formal restrictions, caucuses within each chamber have adopted informal policies to refrain from
requesting earmarks. See, e.g., HISTORY, RULES & PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN
CONFERENCE 10 (2014), https://www.republican.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/65589e31-c1844c95-9947-770f1b3998c1/A669DDFC6A0CAF777199282DC623467F.conference-rules-2015.pdf
(“[I]t is the policy of the Republican Conference that no Member shall request a congressionally
directed spending item . . . .”).
290. Lettermarking is a communication by a member of Congress to an administrative agency
official requesting the specific direction of otherwise non-directed appropriations to a particular
constituency. Jacob R. Neiheisel & Michael C. Brady, Congressional Lettermarks, Ideology, and
Member Receipt of Stimulus Awards from the Department of Labor, RES. & POL., July–Sept.
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and economics research suggests that Congress generally has adhered to its
restrictions on earmarks and that the restrictions have reduced targeted
spending. 291
Enforcing restrictions on special legislation in each legislative chamber will be made easier by the presence of professional legislative personnel
dedicated to the neutral resolution of difficult questions of procedure. The
House of Representatives and the Senate, for example, each have a Parliamentarian who provides expert, nonpartisan advice about legislative procedure based on precedent. 292 If either chamber were to adopt rules about
special legislation, the Parliamentarian would be able to help resolve, in a
nonpartisan manner, questions that arise over whether a particular bill is
special.
Because the chambers of Congress have adopted rules on private legislation and earmarks, have adhered to these self-imposed restrictions, and
have adopted a mechanism for resolving legislative disputes in light of
precedent, it is likely that the proposals in this Part, if adopted, can constrain legislative behavior even though they are not enforceable like constitutional requirements. 293
Second, it is probably not possible to quantify all of the costs and benefits associated with many special laws. Consider, for example, the special
law resolving the ongoing litigation in Bank Markazi. Recall that the special law deemed the assets of the central bank of Iran to be the assets of the
country of Iran for the purpose of a single consolidated case, resulting in the
satisfaction of judgments for victims of terrorism. 294 From an accounting
perspective, the special law that allows the satisfaction of nearly $2 billion
in judgments creates neither a cost nor a benefit, but rather is better characterized as a transfer payment. 295 From the perspective of the claimants,
2017, at 1, 5 (finding that the efficacy of lettermarking is limited); Jacob Dawson & Sam Kleiner,
Curbing Lettermarks, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 201, 202 (2015).
291. Steven Gordon, What Did the Earmark Ban Do? Evidence from Intergovernmental
Grants, 48 J. REGIONAL ANALYSIS & POL’Y, 20, 37 (2018) (finding that earmark restrictions
“may have helped to reverse the trend of increasing grant levels”); Neiheisel & Brady, supra note
290, at 5 (“[M]ost legislators do not appear to have benefitted from writing lettermarks to the bureaucracy.”).
292. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 75, at iii.
293. Similarly, the British Parliament adheres to its rules for considering private bills. See
MAY, supra note 52, at 830, 835–37 (noting that private bills may not proceed when the process
for considering them is defective); see also Anita Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A
Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 16–17 (2009) (arguing that framework statutes, although are not binding, tend to be followed by legislature).
294. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1319–20 (2016).
295. E.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-4, at 38 (2003),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (“Transfer payments are monetary payments from one group to another that do not affect total resources available to society.”).
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however, this special law resulted not only in quantifiable judgments, but
also in the unquantifiable benefit of resolving legal disputes that began decades earlier. But, the statute created costs as well. The Bank Markazi decision itself has led to follow-on litigation that is still ongoing, both in the
United States and in the International Court of Justice.296 Perhaps more importantly, and impossible to quantify, Bank Markazi’s special law arguably
undermines the financial and diplomatic stability achieved by having a coherent and predictable policy toward foreign countries and their central
banks. Because it is not possible to fully quantify the costs and benefits of
many special laws, there may not always be agreement about whether the
elimination of a particular special law is normatively attractive.
Third, the proposals in this Part draw inspiration from the practices of
state legislatures, 297 Congress, 298 federal administrative agencies, 299 and the
Parliament of Great Britain. 300 Although I argue that the proposals are
normatively attractive, I do not suggest that these practices are binding as a
matter of constitutional law.
With these caveats in mind, legislatures should consider one or more
of the following procedural requirements to reduce the costs of special legislation: a rule requiring that special legislation may be enacted only by a
legislative supermajority; a rule requiring public notice and providing an
opportunity for public participation before special legislation is enacted;
and a rule prohibiting special legislation unless it is accompanied by an official statement of the law’s purpose.
B. A Legislative Supermajority Requirement
1. Models for a Legislative Supermajority Requirement
Federal lawmaking sometimes requires a legislative supermajority. 301
Consider just a few examples from the Constitution: a supermajority of the

296. See Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, ¶ 13 (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/164/164-20190213-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf; Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 876 F.3d 63 (2017).
297. E.g., DEL. CONST. art. II, § 19 (requiring supermajority approval before enacting special
legislation); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 32 (requiring publication of the contents of a proposed special bill).
298. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (2012) (describing the congressional reference case process);
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XII, cl. 4, at 25 (2019) (prohibiting certain types
of private laws).
299. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring notice and comment rulemaking process); Chocolate
Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985) (describing the obligations
of an agency during the notice and comment process).
300. See generally DODD, supra note 121 (describing the practice of private petitioning of Parliament); MAY, supra note 52, at 824.
301. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 105, at 710–12.
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Senate is required for the approval of treaties; and a supermajority of both
chambers of Congress is required to override a veto and, when initiated by
Congress, to propose amendments to the Constitution. 302 Outside of the
Constitution, legislative rules have developed to require supermajority support before legislation can be enacted. Most famously, the Senate’s chamber rules effectively require a supermajority for most legislation by permitting a minority to block it, a tactic known as the filibuster. 303
Some state legislatures also abide by supermajority requirements for
lawmaking, including both constitutional rules and internal provisions akin
to the Senate’s supermajority cloture rule. 304 Most notably, a number of
state constitutions require supermajority approval by the legislature before
special legislation may be enacted. 305 Delaware’s constitution is typical: it
permits certain types of special laws, but only provided that two-thirds of
each chamber of its legislature approves the special law. 306 In all of these
examples—the federal Constitution, state constitutions, and the filibuster—
the effect is to slow down the legislative process and screen out minimally
supported laws. 307
2. A Legislative Supermajority Requirement Will Reduce the Cost
of Special Legislation
A legislature can reduce the costs associated with special legislation by
enacting it only by a supermajority. A supermajority requirement will reduce the costs of special legislation in three ways: first, by reducing all special legislation, freeing up legislative time for matters of public concern;
second, by reducing harmful special legislation particularly well; and third,

302. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (requiring the consent of a supermajority of the Senate to make
treaties); id. art. I, § 7 (requiring a supermajority of both chambers of Congress to override a veto);
id. art. V (requiring a supermajority of both chambers of Congress to propose amendments).
303. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XXII, at 15–17 (2013);
GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE
U.S. SENATE 6–7 (2006) (describing the importance of the filibuster to Senate procedure).
304. E.g., ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE UNIFORM RULES, r. 32(a), at 16 (2018) (“The previous question upon all recognized motions or amendments which are debatable may be ordered by
a two-thirds vote of the members present. If ordered, the previous question has the effect of cutting off all debate . . . .”); see also PERMANENT RULES OF THE VERMONT SENATE, r. 55, at 12
(2016) (“A call for the previous question shall not at any time be in order.”).
305. DEL. CONST. art. II, § 19; IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 29; N.J.
CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 10.
306. DEL. CONST. art. II, § 19; Smith v. Balt. & Ohio. R.R., 85 A.2d 73, 75 (Del. Super. Ct.
1951) (“Having failed to pass both Houses of the Legislature by the required two-third vote of all
the members it must be declared invalid.”).
307. CHAFETZ, supra note 95, at 296 (describing the screening function of the Senate filibuster); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 105, at 788 n.359 (describing effects of constitutional
supermajority provisions).
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by failing to reduce beneficial special legislation as thoroughly as it reduces
costly special legislation.
First, a supermajority requirement for special legislation will reduce all
special legislation. As compared with a simple majority, a supermajority
requirement demands that a greater percentage of legislators agree to a bill
before it becomes law. 308 The increased cost (including time, money, and
political capital) that a proponent of special legislation encounters should
lower the demand for special legislation, reducing the likelihood that special legislation will be passed. As a result, a supermajority requirement for
the enactment of special legislation encourages the persistence of the status
quo. 309 Commentators have observed that supermajority requirements impede the passage of bills in the United States Senate, which, because of its
chamber rules, permits a minority to block legislation. Professor Josh
Chafetz has noted that the use of the filibuster in the Senate means that
“many measures with broad and deep support” fail to pass because they
earn “the support of fewer than sixty senators.” 310
Because a supermajority requirement will reduce both beneficial and
costly special legislation, without knowing the details of a particular proposed special law, it is impossible to say whether it will be beneficial or
harmful to reduce its viability through a supermajority requirement. 311
Nevertheless, the reduction of special legislation in general is normatively
attractive in itself because of the costs created by excessive amounts of special legislation. As noted above, an abundance of special legislation can
push public-regarding laws from the legislative agenda. 312 The reduction of
special legislation precipitated by a supermajority requirement would help
clear the legislative docket of special legislation that is likely to attract only
a simple majority. Also, because legislators know that promoting legislation is relatively costly when it requires supermajority support, 313 a supermajority requirement could also reduce costs by encouraging legislators to
spend less time promoting special laws.
Second, a supermajority requirement would reduce special legislation
in a normatively attractive way because it would be particularly successful
at reducing the costs associated with special legislation described above, including corruption and a lack of deliberation. Supermajority requirements
would reduce the likelihood that special legislation is enacted without de308. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 403–04 (1999).
309. Id.
310. CHAFETZ, supra note 95, at 296–97.
311. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 105, at 742 (arguing that supermajority rules are
attractive if baseline rules are attractive).
312. See supra Section II.B.
313. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 105, at 745.
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liberation. As noted above, special legislation both tends to be underdeliberated and also places excessive demands on the legislative agenda
more generally. 314 A supermajority requirement for special legislation (like
all supermajority requirements) can encourage deliberation by making each
legislative vote to secure the passage of a law more valuable. Because each
vote is more valuable, legislators advocating a special bill will have to persuade more colleagues of its merits. Increasing the number of interactions
that must take place among legislators before a law is enacted will promote
the deliberation that accompanies discussion and debate. 315 The goal of enhancing the deliberative process has prompted a number of states to require
their legislatures to enact special laws only with a supermajority of twothirds. 316 The Delaware Supreme Court, for example, noted that its supermajority requirement for special legislation was driven by the “flood of
special bills” that inundated the state’s legislature “and the consequent demands upon the time of the General Assembly.” 317
Similarly, supermajority rules would likely be good at reducing special
legislation that reflects the corruption of the legislative process, either because of overt bribery or because it is enacted for the benefit of powerful
and politically well-connected individuals rather than for the benefit of the
public. 318 By slowing down the legislative process and making each vote
more valuable, a supermajority requirement would expose legislators’ decisions to public scrutiny, which would help reveal whether the decision to
support a bill was corrupt. 319 A supermajority provision would also reduce
special legislation that inures to the benefit of the politically well-connected
by raising the cost of procuring legislative support. The greater the number
of legislators that must agree to enact a special law, the more it will cost to
procure their support. A special law that provides private rather than public

314. See supra Section II.B.
315. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 497 (1995) (describing the connection between debate and deliberation); Staszewski, supra note 135, at 1287–88 (describing benefits of
discussion and debate).
316. DEL. CONST. art. II, § 19; IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 29; N.J.
CONST. art. 4, § 7, ¶ 10.
317. Wright v. Husbands, 131 A.2d 322, 332 (Del. 1957).
318. See Clean Water Coal. v. M Resort, LLC, 255 P.3d 247, 254 (Nev. 2011) (criticizing the
legislature for enacting “special laws for the benefit of individuals instead of enacting laws of a
general nature for the benefit of the public welfare” (quoting Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, 333
(1873))).
319. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Transparency and Corruption, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPARENCY 334 (Jens Forssbaeck & Lars Oxelheim eds.,
2015) (“Transparency can help reduce corruption by exposing the corrupt relationships to public
opprobrium . . . .”); Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal
Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924,
928 (2009) (noting that transparency encourages the public to “pull the alarm on . . . corruption”).
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benefits would be attractive to fewer legislators than a law with public benefits, all else being equal, because fewer legislators would have an incentive
to create a privilege for the special law’s beneficiary. As a result, the proponent of a special law would have to spend more to procure support of legislators who otherwise would have no incentive to enact special legislation
without a public benefit. The increased cost of procuring special laws with
only private benefit would will reduce the demand for them.
Third, although a supermajority requirement would be particularly
successful at reducing the costs of special legislation noted above, it is less
likely to impede special legislation enacted for a public purpose or special
legislation addressing unique circumstances. Even if special, legislation
that is enacted for a public purpose or to address a unique circumstance
would have broad support and, as a result, could be enacted despite the increased difficulty in obtaining a supermajority. Consider, again, the Utah
indemnity law that encouraged a railway to breach the Great Salt Lake
Causeway, averting disaster. 320 Despite the fact that the law was special,
the flooding was a unique circumstance that could not quickly be addressed
by generally applicable law. Moreover, the purpose of the law, to mitigate
flooding damage, was in the public interest. Because of the urgency of the
situation, and because of the importance of the special law, it is likely that
an indemnification law like this one would be so popular that it would garner not only majority, but supermajority, support.
C. Notice and an Opportunity to Participate
A legislature can reduce the costs of special legislation by requiring
public notice before it acts on special legislation. Notice of a law, after it is
enacted, serves the important purpose of providing individuals with
knowledge of the conduct that society prohibits. A person who does not
have notice of what conduct is unlawful is not “free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct.” 321 But, providing notice of a proposed law before it
is enacted serves a different purpose. A person who is notified that a lawmaking body is considering creating a law has the opportunity to participate
in the lawmaking process to some degree, either by opposing the proposed
law 322 or influencing its final shape. 323

320. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 623 (Utah 1990).
321. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
322. Burnett v. Chilton Cty. Health Care Auth., No. 1160958, 2018 WL 4177518, at *6 (Ala.
Aug. 31, 2018) (opining that the notice requirement for special legislation was intended to provide
opponents “a fair opportunity to protest against and oppose its enactment” (quoting Wallace v. Bd.
of Revenue, 37 So. 321, 323 (Ala. 1904))); Deputy Sheriffs Law Enf’t Ass’n of Mobile Cty., v.
Mobile Cty., 590 So. 2d 239, 241 (Ala. 1991) (opining that the purpose of the notice provision “is
to inform all persons affected by the local law, thus giving them an opportunity to voice their op-
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1. Models of Notice and Participation
There is no formal mechanism for public participation in the federal
process of statutory creation. 324 Indeed, Congress is not required to give
public notice that it is considering legislation before it enacts it. Nor is
Congress required to hold hearings on proposed legislation or to take public
views before enacting legislation. 325 And, although Congress often does
gather information before enacting legislation, which can help it decide
whether to legislate, and what legislation should include, 326 congressional
hearings are held at the discretion of Congress, or its individual chambers or
committees, and cannot be required by the public or ordered by a court. 327
The centrality of lobbying to the federal legislative process is a testament to
the fact that the formulation of statutory language is done outside of the
public eye. 328 Even the tangled vines of rules that have grown up around
lobbying do little to make lobbyist influence on members of Congress
transparent to the public. 329
Outside of the federal process of statutory formulation, however, it is
easy to find models of robust public participation in lawmaking. Public
participation, for example, is an integral and well-known part of the federal
rulemaking process. With some exceptions, federal agencies must provide
public notice before they promulgate rules. 330 The notice alerts the public
to the subject of the proposed rulemaking and, in practice, normally inposition”); BAILEY, supra note 109, at 31 (explaining that colonial legislative committees would
consider counter-petitions before determining the facts relevant to a special bill).
323. Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985) (opining
that the purpose of the notice and comment procedure is “to allow the agency to benefit from the
experience and input of the parties who file comments . . . and to see to it that the agency maintains a flexible and open-minded attitude towards its own rules” (quoting Nat’l Tour Brokers
Ass’n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978))); accord BAILEY, supra note 109, at
75 (noting that colonial legislative committees would sometimes decline to enact a special bill
because of public opposition).
324. Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What America Can Learn from Europe, and Vice-Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645, 654–55 (2006) (“In formal terms legislative proposals come only from legislators.”).
325. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (providing exclusive lawmaking prerequisites).
326. James Hamilton et al., Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process, 44 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1115, 1122 (2007).
327. E.g., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC NO. 113-18, r. XXVI, cl. 1, at 31 (2013)
(authorizing standing committees and subcommittees to hold hearings authorized by Senate resolution).
328. Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191,
202 (2012) (noting that lobbying rules do not require lobbyists to disclose activities with a great
level of detail).
329. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to
Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 520 (2007) (arguing that it is difficult even for a
“watchful public citizen” to know how lobbyist behavior influences bill language).
330. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (setting out notice and comment rulemaking procedures for federal
agencies). There are exceptions to the notice requirement that I will not discuss here.
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cludes the text of the proposed rule itself. 331 The notice also provides instructions for public participation, including a time limit for interested
members of the public to submit comments, including “written data, views,
or arguments” for the agency to consider. 332
The notice and opportunity to comment provided during rulemaking is
designed to allow public views to influence agency decision-making. 333 As
described by a number of the United States courts of appeals, the purpose of
notice and comment procedures is to “allow the agency to benefit from the
experience and input of the parties who file comments . . . and to see to it
that the agency maintains a flexible and open-minded attitude towards its
own rules.” 334 Put in a more adversarial tone, but reflecting the same idea,
it has been observed that “public participation requirements . . . force unelected bureaucrats to consider the public interest in the formulation of federal regulations.” 335 In order to achieve this goal, federal agencies may not
simply ignore public comments. Indeed, when finalizing a proposed rule,
an agency is required to publish responses to “significant” public comments, which puts pressure on the agency to explain its decision-making
process. 336 And, as scholars have argued, agencies “do take comments seriously and often modify the final rule” because of comments submitted.337

331. WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE & PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND
CASES 96–97 (4th ed. 2010).
332. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). Although the vast majority of rulemakings attract fewer than 100
comments, a small percentage of proposed rules receive thousands of comments or more. STEVEN
J. BALLA, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PUBLIC COMMENTING ON FEDERAL AGENCY
REGULATIONS: RESEARCH ON CURRENT PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 25–26 (2011). The recent net neutrality
rulemaking, in which 27 million comments were received (many of which were undoubtedly inauthentic), is unusual. PAUL HITLIN & SKYE TOOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC COMMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ABOUT NET NEUTRALITY CONTAIN MANY
INACCURACIES AND DUPLICATES (2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/11/29/publiccomments-to-the-federal-communications-commission-about-net-neutrality-contain-manyinaccuracies-and-duplicates/.
333. JEFFREY LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 271–72 (5th ed. 2012)
(“[T]here is little question that agencies must and do take comments seriously and often modify
the final rule” because of submitted comments.).
334. Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Nat’l Tour Brokers Ass’n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
335. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 246 (1998).
336. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (“An agency must consider
and respond to significant comments received during the period for public comment.”); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that significant comments are
“those which raise relevant points and which, if adopted, would require a change in the agency’s
proposed rule”).
337. LUBBERS, supra note 333, at 272; BALLA, supra note 332, at 35 (“There is little doubt
that comments at times exert fundamental influence over agency decision making.”).
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It is also possible to find examples of notice and public participation in
state rulemaking and legislative processes. Like their federal counterpart,
state legislatures have enacted agency rulemaking procedures, most of
which are at least as elaborate as the federal process described above. 338
Most relevantly, a number of states prohibit special legislation unless notice
of the proposed special law is published in advance of its enactment. 339 In
these states, notice: must be given for an extended period—typically a full
month—before the legislative vote takes place; 340 must include not only the
title, but also the contents, of the bill; 341 and, in the case of a local law, must
be published in the location that will be affected by the proposed statute. 342
When states require notice in advance of the introduction or passage of a
proposed special law, it is typically for the same reasons as the notice and
comment process employed for federal regulations, that is, to influence its
final shape or oppose it. 343 As one state court described, the purpose of its
notice requirement for special legislation “is to inform all those affected . . .
of the proposed legislation to the end that they have an opportunity to oppose such legislation if they deem it unwise.” 344
State legislative rules requiring notice and an opportunity for participation in advance of the enactment of special legislation have a long pedigree.
Since the middle ages, Parliament has treated the private bill process like a
contested proceeding in a court of justice. 345 Still today, the House of
338. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012), with REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT
art. 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
339. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 106 (providing that special laws are void unless public notice is
provided in advance); LA. CONST. art. 3, § 13 (same); MO. CONST. art. 3, § 42 (same); N.J.
CONST. art. 4, § 7, ¶ 8 (same); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 32 (same); TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 57 (same).
340. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 106 (requiring publication for four weeks prior to introduction
into the legislature); LA. CONST. art. 3, § 13 (requiring publication for thirty days before a special
law can be enacted); MO. CONST. art. 3, § 42 (requiring thirty days’ notice before bill can be introduced into the legislature); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 32 (requiring four weeks’ notice before
consideration by the legislature); TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 57 (same).
341. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 106 (requiring publication of the contents of a proposed special
bill); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 32 (same); TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 57 (same).
342. LA. CONST. art. 3, § 13 (requiring publication in the locality affected by the proposed
bill); MO. CONST. art. 3, § 42 (same); TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 57 (same).
343. Burnett v. Chilton Cty. Health Care Auth., No. 1160958, 2018 WL 4177518, at *6 (Ala.
Aug. 31, 2018) (holding that the notice requirement for special legislation was intended to provide
opponents “a fair opportunity to protest against and oppose its enactment” (quoting Wallace v. Bd.
of Revenue, 37 So. 321, 323 (Ala. 1904))).
344. Adam v. Shelby Cty. Comm’n, 415 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Ala. 1982) (quoting Wilkins v.
Woolf, 208 So. 2d 74, 74 (Ala. 1968)); see also State v. Ward, 118 P.2d 216, 220 (Okla. 1941)
(holding that the purpose of the notice requirement is to give the public “an opportunity to appear
before the Legislature and remonstrate against the passage of such law if they did not think it was
wise” (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 113 P. 944, 949 (Okla. 1911))).
345. DEAN, supra note 119, at 249 (describing the contested private bill process in Parliament); MAY, supra note 52, at 825 (describing Parliament’s consideration of private bills as a judicial proceeding).

2019]

LEGISLATIVE DESIGN

461

Commons’s private bill procedure resembles a contested court proceeding,
where “persons whose private interests are to be promoted appear as suitors
for the bill, while those who apprehend injury are admitted as adverse parties in the suit.” 346 Like paying a court filing fee, the promoters of a private
bill are required to pay a fee in order to pursue their claim. 347 Affected parties must be provided notice of the private bill, and failure to do so voids
the proceedings. 348 A committee of members of the House of Commons
sits as a court 349 and the hearing proceeds like a trial: parties are entitled to
present arguments in person, summon witnesses, and tender written evidence; 350 live witnesses can be compelled to testify and are subject to crossexamination; 351 the witnesses are examined under oath by the interested
parties; 352 and the committee takes evidence on, and tries only the matters
asserted in, the bill. 353 After conducting an adversarial proceeding, the
committee can grant relief to the suitor based only on the facts asserted in
the bill as proved by the evidence presented. 354
Parliamentary practice gave rise to similar practices in the American
colonies. 355 For the purpose of settling private claims with special bills, colonial legislatures created legislative committees to handle private petitions. 356 These committees would investigate the facts presented,357 summon witnesses, 358 “accept and consider evidence from all interested parties”
in trial-type proceedings, and rule on the claims. 359

346. MAY, supra note 52, at 825; see HOUSE OF COMMONS PRIVATE BILL OFFICE, GUIDANCE
PETITIONING AGAINST A PRIVATE BILL IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2018, at 3–5 (UK) (describing the process for petitioning against a private bill); STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS: PRIVATE BUSINESS SO 127, at 53 (2017) (UK) [hereinafter STANDING ORDERS] (describing proceedings in cases of private petitions).
347. STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, at 97 (Table of Fees); DEAN, supra note 119, at 232
(describing fees to be paid by private bill promoters).
348. STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SOs 4(1), 10(1), 22, at 5, 8, 14; MAY supra note 52,
at 843, 892–93.
349. STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SOs 89–91, at 43–44.
350. MAY, supra note 52, at 944–45; STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SOs 13–16, at 137–
36 (Rules for the Practice and Procedure of the Court of Referees on Private Bills) (describing the
reception of oral and written evidence).
351. MAY, supra note 52, at 944–45.
352. Id.
353. STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SO 136, at 55.
354. MAY, supra note 52, at 953; STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SOs 136, 142, at 55,
56.
355. HARLOW, supra note 123, at 11, 14, 20, 64 (describing the development of standing
committees in colonial legislatures to deal with petitions); Desan, supra note 125, at 192 (same).
356. HARLOW, supra note 123, at 11, 20, 64; Desan, supra note 125, at 192.
357. HARLOW, supra note 123, at 14, 16.
358. Id. at 16.
359. BAILEY, supra note 109, at 31.
ON
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Notice and Participation Reduces the Cost of Special
Legislation

Legislatures can reduce the costs of special legislation by providing
public notice and an opportunity to participate in the legislative process
along the lines described above. Notice of, and an opportunity to respond
to, proposed special legislation will reduce the likelihood that the legislative
process will be corrupted, reduce the likelihood that special legislation is
enacted without deliberation, and help remove special legislation from the
legislative agenda. Notice and participation is less likely to reduce legislation that is enacted for the public benefit or legislation that will decrease
disuniformity in the law.
First, notice and an opportunity to participate will reduce special legislation reflecting the corruption of the legislative process. Notice will reduce
special legislation procured through bribery by shedding light on the actions
of legislators themselves. Even the (admittedly rare) legislator inclined to
introduce and support legislation for an overtly corrupt purpose will be less
willing to do so when public notice threatens to expose the arrangement and
embarrass the self-dealing legislator. 360
Notice and participation will also reduce legislation designed to benefit a politically powerful individual rather than the public. As noted, a person who stands to benefit from a special bill has a strong motivation to influence a legislator to introduce and support it. And a legislator who
proposes a special bill on behalf of a particular beneficiary can often rely on
a culture of logrolling for its passage. 361 As a result of logrolling, it is often
the case that a special bill that is deeply important to one constituent, and of
little consequence to others, is enacted despite the fact that it serves little or
no purpose other than to enrich the beneficiary. 362 The requirement of notice before a special law is enacted will mitigate the effects of logrolling.
Notice that a special bill has been proposed will alert constituents that a
special benefit may be distributed and encourage otherwise minimally interested members of the public to pay attention to the potential impact of
the bill, inquire into its necessity, and oppose it if they deem it unwise. 363

360. PARKER, supra note 107, at 40 (“[T]he longer a legislator is involved in favor selling the
greater the risk of being found out and punished.”); Coglianese et al., supra note 319, at 298 (arguing that transparency encourages the public to “pull the alarm on extreme forms of agency
wrongdoing, such as corruption”); Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 319, at 334 (“Transparency can
help reduce corruption by exposing the corrupt relationships to public opprobrium . . . .”).
361. Ireland, supra note 46, at 273–75.
362. PARKER, supra note 107, at 30–31; see Gillette, supra note 46, at 648–49 (describing
logrolling in the context of special legislation).
363. Burnett v. Chilton Cty. Health Care Auth., No. 1160958, 2018 WL 4177518, at *6 (Ala.
Aug. 31, 2018) (holding that the notice requirement for special legislation was intended to provide
opponents “a fair opportunity to protest against and oppose its enactment” (quoting Wallace v. Bd.
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Second, notice and opportunity to participate will reduce special laws
that fail to reflect deliberation. Notice and participation facilitate deliberation by slowing down the legislative process, extending the time between
formulation of the text of the bill and its enactment. This delay ensures that
legislators have an extended opportunity to review and discuss a bill before
voting on it. 364 Perhaps more importantly, notice and an opportunity for
participation will permit those affected by the laws—not just members of
the legislature—to make their views known. By exposing legislators to a
diverse set of views, a requirement of notice and an opportunity to participate will ensure that legislators are aware of the full range of the public’s
views on the proposed legislation. The public airing of differing views on
proposed legislation make it more difficult, politically, for legislators to ignore these views.
Third, notice and an opportunity to participate will help remove unpopular special legislation from the legislative agenda. By exposing its
proponents to additional public scrutiny, and by slowing down the process
generally, notice and opportunity for participation will increase the cost of
promoting special legislation. This increased cost should reduce their supply, that is, the frequency of their introduction. A legislator with limited
time and political capital is unlikely to waste much time on bills that are unlikely to pass because of the significant cost associated with their passage.
As a result, a notice and participation requirement should reduce the number of special bills that are introduced, which, in turn, will free up legislative time for deliberation about more promising legislation.
Fourth, although notice and public participation would reduce costly
special legislation, it would be less likely to reduce beneficial special legislation, like legislation that has a public purpose and legislation that reduces
disuniformity in the law. Special legislation that has a public purpose
would likely not be discouraged by a requirement for notice and participation. If a proposed law has a public purpose rather than a private purpose,
then publicity due to notice and participation should not dissuade legislators
from supporting it. Even more, a proposed law with broad public support
should be more popular after notice and public participation. Indeed, legislators might seek to prioritize a special law with broad public support over
an equally meritorious bill without public support. Similarly, the passage of
a special bill that seeks to reduce disuniformity by eliminating a special
privilege should not be impeded by notice and public participation. A speof Revenue, 37 So. 321, 323 (1904))); State v. Ward, 118 P.2d 216, 220 (Okla. 1941) (holding that
the purpose of the notice requirements is to give the public “an opportunity to appear before the
Legislature and remonstrate against the passage of such law if they did not think it was wise”).
364. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 n.23 (1983) (noting that a more elaborate legislative
process provides opportunity for debate and deliberation). For example, in a number of states, the
notice period before special legislation can be enacted is one month. See supra note 340.
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cial bill to take away a special privilege would likely be popular; as with a
special law with a public purpose, notice and public participation should
only increase the likelihood of the enactment of a special law eliminating a
special privilege.
There are two situations in which notice and public participation might
impede beneficial special legislation. As discussed above, emergency special legislation, like the Utah statute designed to incentivize a railway to
help avoid massive flooding, will likely prove popular once its purpose is
publicized. 365 For this reason, notice and public participation would likely
not prevent emergency special legislation. However, because of the delay
inherent in a process of notice and public participation, even very popular
special legislation might be rendered moot by the time it can be enacted.
In addition, a special law that reduces disuniformity by curing a defect
in the generally applicable laws, or by stripping an individual of a disability, might be impeded by notice and public participation. Take, for example, the O’Brian case, in which the Maryland legislature enacted a special
law to allow a contractor to be paid after a generally applicable law mistakenly prevented him from being paid for work already completed. 366 Although there are obvious equitable reasons for the legislature to support the
contractor’s special bill, only the contractor’s representative in the legislature has a direct interest in supporting a special bill for the contractor’s benefit. Other members of the legislature may believe they have little to gain
from supporting a special law for the benefit of a non-constituent. And
members of the public might prefer to spare the public the cost of making
the contractor whole even though the cost would be minimal for each member of the public. In this case, notice and participation may prevent a special law where, in the absence of notice and participation, it would have
been passed due to logrolling and public disinterest. 367
D. Legislative Reason-Giving
Official reason-giving by the legislature—or by some body empowered by the legislature to give reasons for the enactment of legislation—can
reduce the costs of special legislation without eliminating its benefits.

365. See supra Section III.B.
366. O’Brian v. Cty. Comm’rs, 51 Md. 15, 20–21 (1879).
367. An objection to modeling public participation for special legislation on the notice and
comment process is the fact that few people participate in the notice and comment process. See
BALLA, supra note 332, at 25–26. However, because legislators have an incentive to publicize
both the legislative action and inaction of themselves and others, it is likely that participation
would be more robust for proposed legislation than for administrative agency rulemaking.
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1. Models of Legislative Reason-Giving
Although the Constitution requires each chamber of Congress to keep
and publish a journal of its proceedings, 368 there is no constitutional requirement either for individual legislators,369 or for the legislature as a
whole, 370 to explain the introduction or enactment of a bill. 371 Nevertheless,
committee reports, authored by congressional 372 and some state legislative 373 committees, often provide robust explanations for the enactment of
legislation. More specifically, both state and federal practice have models
for official reason-giving to accompany the enactment of special legislation.
First, some states require official reason-giving as part of the enactment of
special legislation. 374 For example, Mississippi’s constitution broadly prohibits special laws; 375 however, it also provides a safe harbor for the enactment of special legislation, provided that the legislature gives reasons for its
enactment. 376 Specifically, Mississippi requires each chamber of its legislature to appoint a standing committee on local and private legislation. Before it is enacted, every special bill must be referred to this standing committee, which must report back to the legislature “with a recommendation in
writing” to enact the special law, “stating affirmatively the reasons therefor.” 377 Recalling British tradition that extends back to the Middle Ages, 378
the committee must also state “why the end to be accomplished should not

368. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5; see also STORY, supra note 278, at 590–92 (explaining the Constitution’s Journal Clause).
369. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (providing that a member of Congress may not be questioned
in any other place for a speech or debate given in Congress); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 204 (1880) (extending Speech or Debate Clause protections to “the act of voting”).
370. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (providing exclusive lawmaking prerequisites); see also U.S.
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“[T]his Court has never insisted that a legislative
body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.”).
371. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636–38 (1995) (contrasting the typical absence of reason giving in statutory language with judicial or executive reason giving).
372. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 119
(4th ed. 1996) (describing the committee report process).
373. In most state legislatures, legislative history, including committee reports, plays a limited
role. Richard A. Briffault, Beyond Congress: The Study of State and Local Legislatures, 7 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25 (2003).
374. MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 89; N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
375. MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 87.
376. Id. § 89.
377. Id.
378. DODD, supra note 121, at 80–81 (explaining that Parliament would reject private petitions
on the ground that the matter could be adequately resolved by a court under the common law).
Similarly, in early Congresses, even meritorious petitions for special laws were rejected if Congress anticipated later enacting a general law to cover the situation. diGiacomantonio, supra note
117, at 39.
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be reached by a general law, or by a proceeding in court.” 379 In this model,
the legislature is empowered to enact special legislation, but only if a legislative committee explains why a special law is the appropriate way to address the problem. 380
Second, although, most federal statutes are not accompanied by detailed official reasons for their enactment, a relatively obscure corner of
federal practice maintains a role for legislative reason-giving for certain
types of special laws. 381 By resolution, either chamber of Congress may refer a bill seeking money from the Treasury to the United States Court of
Federal Claims. 382 Either chamber of Congress may refer this type of special bill when the relief sought cannot be obtained through the normal legal
processes, for example, when the limitations period has run 383 or because
sovereign immunity prevents a suit. 384
When the Court of Federal Claims receives a bill referred to it by a
chamber of Congress, it is required to ascertain whether the demand contained in the bill is “a legal or equitable claim,” as opposed to a gratuity,
and the amount due from the United States to the claimant. 385 In order to
make this determination, the court conducts a hearing that, although advisory in nature, bears the hallmarks of a judicial trial. The court has the power
to issue subpoenas, take testimony, and hear argument, all for the purpose
of determining whether a claim is meritorious. Ultimately, the court must
submit its findings of fact and legal conclusions as a “report” to the chamber of Congress that referred the case.386 Although it is merely advisory,

379. MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 89.
380. In the case of Mississippi, the constitutional requirement of official reason-giving relies
on legislative self-enforcement; the courts “will not consult legislative journals to determine
whether” the legislature complied with the reference and recommendation process or invalidate a
special law in the absence of evidence that it did so. Tunica Cty. v. Town of Tunica, 227 So. 3d
1007, 1022–23 (Miss. 2017).
381. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (2012) (describing the process by which private bills are referred to the United States Court of Federal Claims).
382. Id. § 1492. Not all bills for money damages can be referred to the Court of Federal
Claims. For example, § 1492 expressly excludes pensions. Id.
383. Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 394, 407 n.13 (2011), aff’d, 697 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that the running of a statute of limitations may make a case “appropriate for a congressional reference, wherein a bill is referred to the chief judge of this court by
either house of Congress for review by a three judge panel”).
384. Cal. Canners & Growers Ass’n v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 69, 74, 86 (1984) (recognizing
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar consideration of congressional reference
claims).
385. 28 U.S.C. § 2509(c); see H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON THE
CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL JUSTICE, 114TH CONG., RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR PRIVATE CLAIMS
BILLS 72 (Comm. Print 2015) (describing principles guiding the committee’s consideration of
claims).
386. 28 U.S.C. § 2509(b)–(e).
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the report transmitted to Congress has the form and level of detail of a judicial opinion. 387
2.

Legislative Reason-Giving Reduces the Cost of Special
Legislation

A legislative reason-giving requirement along the lines of the models
described above can reduce the costs of special legislation without eliminating its benefits entirely. First, a rule requiring reason-giving to accompany
special legislation will reduce the likelihood that special legislation reflecting corruption is enacted. Requiring a reasoned explanation for the enactment of special legislation will help make the purpose of the special law
transparent. Transparency, in turn, gives the public the opportunity to “pull
the alarm on . . . [the] corruption” that drives some special legislation. 388
Similarly, once the reasoning underlying the special law is laid bare, other
legislators will have an opportunity to challenge it and expose it if it lacks a
public purpose. Just as it is easier to respond effectively to a reasoned argument than to an ipse dixit conclusion, because the premises and supporting evidence of a reasoned argument are revealed, it is easier to test the
soundness of a statute accompanied by official reasons than a statute without them. Put another way, requiring reason-giving will reveal the faulty
premises and logical flaws in an explanation of a hard-to-justify special
law. 389
Second, giving reasons will reduce the statutory imposition of unjustifiable inequalities by exposing those inequalities that cannot be justified.
As Professor Frederick Schauer has explained, the act of providing reasons
for a particular outcome presupposes that there is a general rule that drives
that outcome. 390 Consider Schauer’s example: “You ask why I am carrying
an umbrella, and I respond that the weather forecast predicted rain. Although the response is not explicitly prescriptive, it embraces the mandate,
‘Carry an umbrella when rain is forecast’ . . . .” 391 In other words, by
providing a reason for carrying the umbrella, the carrier implicitly states a
general rule that controls similar cases. Any time rain is forecast, one
would expect to see the carrier with an umbrella.
Because reason-giving requires the statement, explicitly or implicitly,
of a general principle, a legislature giving reasons for a special law will
have a hard time explaining the principle underlying a law that creates unjustified inequalities. Take for example the Tesla Laws, described above,
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Sneeden v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 671, 672 (1994).
Coglianese et al., supra note 319, at 928.
See Schauer, supra note 371, at 652–53.
Id. at 642–43.
Id. at 642.
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that created special exemptions for Tesla and no other carmaker to sell electric cars outside of the traditional manufacturer-dealer relationship. 392 Perhaps, as Tesla argued when Maryland’s Tesla Law was passed, a legislator
would assert that the purpose of the law was to encourage “innovation,”
“free markets,” and “consumer choice.” 393 But, of course, none of these
reasons—innovation, free markets, or consumer choice—justifies a Teslaspecific law rather than a generally applicable law. Indeed, if any of these
principles were the real goal of Maryland’s Tesla Law, a generally applicable law would have been a better fit. Consumer choice and free markets
would be enhanced by a law permitting all manufacturers of electric cars to
take advantage of the new leniencies accorded to Tesla. And, opening
Maryland’s automobile market to future electric carmakers would encourage innovation through competition. Maryland’s Tesla Law, in fact, stifled
free-market competition, and with it, innovation, by providing Tesla with
protection from competitors; and it limited consumer choice by restricting
entry into the electric car market. A reason-giving requirement would expose the unjustifiable inequality imposed by Maryland’s Tesla Law. If required to give a reason for its unequal treatment of Tesla, the Maryland legislature would have had to generalize the law, strain to distinguish Tesla
from present and future competitors in a meaningful way, or admit that the
purpose was to accord a special benefit to Tesla.394
Third, special legislation reflecting justifiable inequalities would likely
not be eliminated because of a requirement for legislative reason-giving.
Rather, special laws imposing justifiable inequalities would be easy to explain through legislative reason-giving. Consider, again, the Utah indemnity law that encouraged a railway to breach the Great Salt Lake causeway. 395
If Utah’s legislature had to give reasons for this special law, it would be
able to generalize the decision to indemnify the railway by explaining that
anyone should be protected from liability for property damage when acting
to avert greater damage. This principle is easily justifiable because it is coherent with other areas of the law that recognize a defense for those acting
to avoid a greater harm. 396 As a result, the Utah legislature, if forced to ex392. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 15-305(e)(2) (West 2010 & Supp. 2018).
393. Debord, supra note 1.
394. A reason-giving requirement would also, in part, mitigate the fact that special legislation
often fails to provide guidance. Although special legislation interferes with the coherence of the
law and makes it less predictable, legislative reason-giving should both publicize these exceptions
and explain their limits. The contextualization of a special law should provide guidance about the
scope of its application.
395. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 623 (Utah 1990).
396. E.g., State v. Wells, 598 N.W.2d 30, 35 (Neb. 1999) (holding that a defendant’s evidence
of the defense of justification or “choice of evils” includes “facts showing that he or she (1) acted
to avoid a greater harm; (2) reasonably believed that the particular action was necessary to avoid a
specific and immediately imminent harm; and (3) reasonably believed that the selected action was
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plain the special indemnity law, could have made a cogent, well-reasoned
argument as to why it was in the public interest.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislature is charged with many of the difficult policy decisions
that governments must make. In order to ensure that it is acting in the public interest, rather than out of pique or favoritism, the legislature must undertake the task of weighing the costs and benefits of proposed legislation.
Legislative rules can help accomplish a legislature’s goal of enacting laws
with benefits that outweigh their costs. By requiring special legislation to
be enacted only by a supermajority, requiring notice and allowing for public
participation, or requiring official reasons to accompany the enactment of
special laws, legislatures will make it more difficult to enact special laws
that create significant costs. By adopting and adhering to these legislative
rules, legislatures will better be able to ensure that they are promoting the
public welfare.

the least harmful alternative to avoid the harm”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (AM. LAW
INST. 1962) (setting out elements for the defense of choice of evils).

